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ABSTRACT
 
This is a text printed on paper. I have written it using a computer.  You might read 
this text in re-digitalized form, as a PDF file. In this case, you see it as the image of the 
document it became; it exists as a picture of itself. The pages in a PDF-file are not tangible 
(Gittelman, Paper Knowledge 114ff). However, if you are indeed reading this text in digital 
form, there will have to be some tangible thing making you see the image of this 
document. Some thing is functioning as an interface right now. Although I do not know 
exactly what this thing is, I know for certain that there is something here, slipping  
your mind as you read this text. This knowledge and this slipping away is what this thesis 
is about.  This thesis aims to question the sustaining support of digital objects. 
I try to challenge the habitualization towards digital devices, the forgetting of the physical 
interface that leads to the supposition of digital immateriality, by making the com- 
puter apparent as an absurd thing that escapes language. Leaning on Heidegger’s »Question 
Concerning Technology« and Mel Bochner’s mural stating that »No Thought Exists 
Without a Sustaining Support«, I seek to position myself among these strange and aloof 
digital things and their effects. I attempt to encircle the ungraspable realm of the 
computer’s black box by explicating its formal material (Kirschenbaum), which results from 
the fundamentally irresolvable tension between the metaphysical idea of the Turing 
machine and the worldly stuff that embodies and performs it. 
    First, I approach this stuff through language. I introduce three metaphors to compare 
the computer to other worldly things: ruins (considering the existence of the machine, its 
resting body, and the expectations and promises it entails), vessels (thinking about its 
function), and windows (reflecting the notion of digital transparency and contingency). 
Then, I verbally enter the computer, contemplating how its mechanism depends on an act 
of inscription, a physical in-formation of material, and how its effects can therefore also be 
understood as writing, as embodied information. 
    However as computing has become ubiquitous, seamless and powerful enough to super- 
sede the speed of thinking (Kittler S), it has become increasingly difficult, if not impossible, 
to phenomenologically grasp any friction resulting from this embodiment in the workings 
of the machines as they operate. In my practice, I physically grapple with this highly 
evasive body of digital media. Building on the metaphors and terminology I establish, and 
looking for comparisons between Bochner’s post-conceptual sensibility and post-digital 
ideas, I aim to evoke the things on which I rely but that lie outside of language: I attempt 
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with a knowing futility to (re-)insert myself in the processes of digital translation. I slow 
the effects of the computer down, I empty out its already silent interfaces, aiming to 
re-present it. I constellate and associate pieces of work, suggesting a grammar rather than  
a narrative, in order to listen to the »language of things« (Benjamin). 
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» I have to choose what I detest — either dreaming, which my intelligence hates, or action, 
which my sensibility loathes; either action, for which I wasn’t born, or dreaming, for 
which no one was born. / Detesting both, I choose neither; but since I must on occasion 
either dream or act, I mix the two things together. «  
 
Fernando Pessoa, Text 2 of The Book of Disquiet
13
0 This text exists in various materializations. I wrote it using a plain text editor on my 
computer and saved it as a txt-file. As it grew, I realized that its very existence as  
a digital object and more importantly the physicality of the bits encoding it, which lay 
outside my grasp, are what the conceptual content of this text is trying to encircle. To 
focus on the /stuff/ that is imperative for this text to become recognizable, readable,  
and thus conceptual, I decided to introduce it by explicating its material reality. I  
deliberately chose a poor quality representation, to trigger what Karl Schawelka describes  
as a ›frustrated synthesis‹ (26)--the compli cation of the well practiced and unconsciously 
performed act of recognition. As I do not want to seem intentionally obnoxious, the rest  
of the thesis is laid out conventionally. I am also attaching this introduction in this re-
formatted form as an appendix. 
    This text now exists as the finished raw txt-file [1], as a laid out PDF-file [2], and 
in the form of five bound 'hard' copies [3]. One of those books contains the actual, 
physical pages that have become the images that make up the following pages in the PDF-file 
you might be reading right now. The bits that make up this text have been scattered across 
numerous devices: hard disks on remote servers, flash storage on ebook readers, printers, 
etc. Their physical presence has produced--or is producing--the concrete instantiation of 
the text you are reading right now, either as some kind of organized smudges resting on a 
substrate, or as a shadowy glow of a screen. 
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1 Bonnie Mak likewise notes that »despite its central role in the transmission of thought, 
the page often passes without registration or remark. So habituated to its operation, 
we often overlook how the page sets the parameters for our engagement with ideas« (9).
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2 The Japanese language has a rich vocabulary to grasp this endurance of the underwhelming 
noise of sheer things. To give just one example: the term /aware/ »is applied to the 
aspects of nature (or life, or art) that move a susceptible individual to an awareness of 
the ephemeral beauty of a world in which change is the only constant. His or her reaction 
may be a resigned melancholy or an awe, or even a measured and accepting pleasure« (Richie 
52). See also: Francesco Orlando’s extensive study /Obsolete Objects in the Literary 
Imagination. Ruins, Relics, Rarities, Rubbish, Uninhabited Places, and Hidden Treasures./ 
3 As a trained typographer, I am intimately aware of the standards of written communication.  
Typography is the attempt to give language a (reproducible) form. Good typography — in the  
eyes of many — makes the traces of the work of the typographer invisible: it lowers the noise  
of the materials of the text. A typographer manipulates this material to communicate ideas  
effectively. In order to do so, I need to get in touch with those materials of communication:  
this once meant setting actual, tangible lead characters, today it means to handle digital  
tools. I think it is fair to say I have what Richard Sennett calls a »material consciousness«  
for text (120).  
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 overleaf: 
 overleaf: image depicting a ›fatberg‹ in a London sewer. | The Oxford 
Dictionaries define a fatberg as »[a] very large mass of solid  
waste in a sewerage system, consisting especially of congealed fat and 
personal hygiene products that have been flushed down toilets.« (ONE)
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1 
THE CONDITION   
 
 
1.1 APPROACHING THE COMPUTER
This text was written and is been written using a COMPUTER. 
    The writing I am conjuring up on the screen in front of me here and now is supported 
differently than the writing you see on the page in front of you. (Although not so much  
if you are reading this thesis as a PDF-file.) Even though the text is right there, and despite 
the fact that I can easily edit it — just now I made the whole text disappear and reappear 
again by pressing just a few buttons on the keyboard (cmd+A | cmd+X | cmd+V), it was all 
gone but still in there, somewhere, somehow — it is out of reach and intangible; to edit  
it is not to manipulate it (from Latin manipulus = ›handful‹) (»manipulation«).  Text and sub- 
strate feel utterly dislodged.  The words I see are phantoms (Kittler G 22). 
    Their appearance is an effect of light passing from the back of the screen through little 
pixels, actual little things; but as they are too small to me to discern I tend to forget about 
them.  The liquid crystals of the pixels either block the light or let it pass through. Some  
of this light travels the short distance between the screen and my eyes. When it hits my 
retina, the light turns into electrical impulses, these impulses travel to my brain, my brain 
synthesizes and recognizes that the text appearing on the screen exists and means.
[After Karin Winter got her eyes lasered in 1999 using the newly developed 
technique called aberrometry in which the distance between the lens and the 
retina is precisely measured, she had a vision of 23/10. That is 2.3 times 
better than what is considered average vision. She quickly noticed a downside 
of being able to see so exceptionally well: she was bothered by having to see 
the space in between the pixels of her TV set. (Focus)]
I do not know where those electrical signals triggering the light and shadow of the pixels 
have their precise origin. It must be somewhere right under the keyboard I am typing on. 
    Jacques Derrida aptly described this inevitable profound ignorance of the material of 
digital writing as follows: 
I know how to make it work (more or less) but I don’t know how it works. [...] Not knowing, in  
this case, is a distinctive trait, one that does not apply with pens or with typewriters either. With 
pens and typewriters, you think you know how it works, how ›it responds.‹ Whereas with 
computers, even if people know how to use them up to a point, they rarely know, intuitively and 
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 overleaf: image of an e-waste landfill. 
»[T]he profound peace which, like a holy charmed circle, surrounds the 
ruin, conveys a sense of this constellation: the obscure antagonism which 
determines the form of all existence--now acting among merely natural 
forces, now only within psychic life, and now, as in the present case, 
taking place between nature and matter. This antagonism--although here too 
it is in disequilibrium--letting one side preponderate as the other sinks 
into annihilation, nevertheless offers us a quietly abiding image, secure 
in its form. The aesthetic value of the ruin combines the disharmony, the 
eternal becoming of the soul struggling against itself, with the formal 
satisfaction, the firm limitedness of the work of art« (Simmel 384) (TWO)
without thinking — at any rate, I don’t know — how the internal demon of the apparatus operates. 
What rules it obeys.  This secret with no mystery frequently marks our dependence in relation to 
many instruments of technology. We know how to use them and what they are for, without 
knowing what goes on with them, in them, on their side; and this might give us plenty to think 
about with regard to our relationship with technology today — to the historical newness of this 
experience. (Derrida 23) 
Are there ways to make manifest how this peculiar device in front of me is making the 
text cling to itself right now — as a thing, not as an abstract concept? Is it possible to find 
ways to think »without words, on things, with things« (Sartre 130) while they function  
as digital interfaces, designed to slip the mind? 4
    To do so, I borrowed Martin Heidegger’s idea of ›questioning‹ which he explains in the 
very beginning of The Question Concerning Technology: 
In what follows we shall be questioning concerning technology. 
Questioning builds a way. We would be advised, therefore, above all to  
pay heed to the way, and not to fix our attention on isolated sen- 
tences and topics.  The way is a way of thinking.  All ways of thinking, 
more or less perceptible, lead through language in a manner that is 
extraordinary. (Heidegger Q 3)
Heidegger’s ›way‹ leads into the meta- 
physical. In his attempt to grasp the 
essence of technology, he played with 
words, he used language like a material. 
Heidegger bent and twisted language  
in ways that are extraordinarily hard and 
sometimes even impossible to translate 
into English. He alienated language to 
make it do something: the aim of his 
essay was not first and foremost to arrive 
at the conclusion that the essence of 
technology lays in the Gestell, but in the 
›exemplification‹ of his way of thinking 
through language. (I explain the idea of 
Gestell in this annotation >5.) Through 
this thesis, and in my practice, I aim to 
5 Albert Borgmann regards William Lovitt’s 1977 trans- 
lation of /Gestell/ as the neologism ›enframing‹ to  
be ›unfortunate‹ (Borgmann BCH 428). He recommends the 
word ›framework‹, which still does not quite capture 
the meaning of /Gestell/: the German prefix /Ge-/ forms 
a collective noun. If /Ge-/ is followed by a verb 
form, it denotes the result of a completed passive 
action. 
— /Gebäck/, from /backen/ = ›to bake‹, literally means 
›that which has been baked‹, ›pastries‹, ›biscuits‹, 
etc. 
— /Gebirge/, from /bergen/ = ›to retrieve‹, also ›to  
salvage‹, literally means ›that which has been re- 
trieved‹, ›the mountains‹ (Heidegger also frequently 
uses /verbergen/ = ›conceal‹ and /entbergen/ = ›to re- 
veal‹). 
Heidegger used this word form to point at the force 
that is causing the addressed action. He calls this 
force »that which gathers« (Heidegger Q 19). 
/Gebirge/ thus is read as »that which causes the 
gathering of the mountains«, »that which retrieves / 
reveals the mountains«. >>> 
4 Some digital effects are 
designed to alert a user, 
to intrude upon his or  
her mind. However, I would 
like to argue that — even 
in such cases — it is not 
the body of the thing 
that sustains this effect 
that intrudes, but its 
functioning as an interface. 
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question in order to build a way (or to span a field) that leads away from language, away 
from the metaphysical, towards the silent and aloof physical things sustaining (digital) 
objects, and thus, finally, towards a confrontation with how it is human recognition that 
makes those things meaningful. Bill Brown writes that things »lie beyond the grid of 
intelligibility the way mere things lie outside the grid of museal exhibition, outside the 
order of objects.« As a »relief from ideas (what’s encountered as opposed to what’s 
thought)«, the Thing names »that enigma that can only be encircled and which the object 
(by its presence) necessarily negates.« With this thesis, I try to encircle the thingness of 
computers with a constellation of words, images and artifacts.  
    After visually introducing my practical work, I will now proceed in this encircling by 
approaching the computer with three metaphors. Metaphors are figures of speech and 
thought, the attempt to describe the unknown through a figure that is known. Metaphors 
are therefore often used to explain the experience of cultural artefacts by comparing  
them with natural objects (Krysmanski 1). I point toward the thingness of computers by 
comparing them to other man-made objects: ruins, vessels, and windows, using these meta- 
phors as ways of thinking around the habitualized language of digital objects. Wendy Chun 
notes that »metaphors dominate user interfaces«, because they »make abstract computer 
tasks familiar, concrete, and easy to grasp, since through them we allegedly port already 
existing knowledge to new tasks.« (Chun P 57) Digital objects are described variously as 
›folders‹, ›waste bins‹, ›desktops‹, ›inboxes‹, or ›clipboards‹, while the further abstracted  
idea of the internet and data storage is referred to as a ›cloud‹. Because »[c]omputers, under- 
stood as universal machines, stand in for 
substitution itself« (ibid.), they are per- 
ceived to be empty, created not to exist 
as independent objects but for their 
function, a (metaphorical) performance 
of likeness.  There always needs to be this 
other thing that is not the computer that 
can be substituted by turning it into a 
codable metaphor that acts to fill the 
computer’s seemingly abstract functions 
with comprehensible meaning. I aim to 
use these three metaphors to move away 
from the familiar and conventional 
language of the computer, to expose the 
stuff that sustains the alleged magic of its 
>>> —  /Gestell/, from /stellen/ = ›to put‹, ›to set‹ 
(in the sense of putting something so it stands, 
Lovitt translates it as ›setting-upon‹), literally 
means »that which has been put to stand«, ›rack‹, 
›frame(work)‹, ›stand‹. Heidegger defines the essence  
of technology as a mindset that ›enframes‹ all things, 
causing us to regard them as resources (/Bestand/,  
from /stehen/ = ›to stand‹, literally meaning ›that 
which stands‹), is meant to be »that, which can be 
exploited (because it is set to stand)«. Technology 
challenges all things. It sets (/stellen/) them so they 
stand (/stehen/) as resources (/Bestand/), ready to be 
summoned and exploited (/bestellen/, which not only 
translates as›to order (goods)‹, ›to summon‹, but also 
as ›to cultivate‹ (land, a field), ›to till‹).  
Heidegger’s /Gestell/, even though deduced 
painstakingly by alienating everyday language, is not 
that different from Flusser’s idea of ›typification‹. 
Both Heidegger and Flusser shared the concern that such 
an abstracting mindset might pose the biggest threat 
to humanity (cf. Borgmann BCH 430, and Flusser 52).
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surface effects, and to question its ungraspable thingness: the gap between the thing and the 
objects that we habitually recognize. If, as Mel Bochner put it »language is not trans- 
parent«, is it possible to use its opacity to approach the ungraspability of digital objects?
1.1.1 THE RUIN   
›Ruining‹ my computer, crumpling it in a metal crusher, may break the device, but would 
it destroy this text within it? The text might physically still remain in there — somehow, 
somewhere — stored as magnetic or electrical charges, but without a working interface  
to get it out of there one could just as well consider it to be lost. Crushing the materiality of 
the computer would render it a useless thing and consequently silence the text. 6
    A computer does not slowly age, wither away and wear out like other everyday objects. 
Digital death is sudden, sharp and relentless. If it ceases to function, 
a computer immediately turns into an aloof, awkward box, an 
empty case. It might become ›slower‹ over time when new software 
demands more resources, yet this is not a sign of the machine’s 
gradual demise — digital bits do not rust or burn out like a light 
bulb — but of changed expectations (and probably of planned 
obsolescence.) Today, a computer is often replaced even before it 
stops working (Spinks). Still full of unwanted potential it then 
becomes a kind of ruin, catching dust on a shelf or, shipped out of 
sight, wasting away in an e-waste dump (Vidal, Parikka 142).
    As an obsolete object, a crumpled laptop or a discarded smart- 
phone could be interesting: a broken interface tells a story about 
what its now deranged physical make-up once made possible.  
A silenced digital device may raise questions about the reasons for 
its abandonment.  The uselessness of unwanted electronic devices 
can be understood as a foil of their former potential (cf. Orlando 
5f).  They are strange objects. 
    Indeed, there is an ever growing interest in media archeology — 
 the study of these ruins, of the obsolescent devices and the 
practices and forms of communication they formerly established. 
Lori Emerson and Matthew Kirschenbaum set up labs with old 
computer equipment to recreate and preserve, and thus also 
understand, how the peculiarities of these systems informed how 
writers used them.  Their interest grew out of practical questions 
6 In /Mechanisms. New Media 
and the Forensic Imagination/ 
Matthew Kirschenbaum examines 
the reading and writing 
mechanism of hard disks. He 
explains how they cause 
physical manifestations of  
data, /traces/, that, despite 
being inaccessible to human 
senses, are not at all 
immaterial. Looking at the 
techniques of computer 
forensics (»the activity of 
recovering or retrieving 
electronic data, analying and 
interpreting it for 
its evidentiary value, and 
preserving the integrity of 
the data« [M 46]) he notes 
that the »magnetic in- 
scription is a temporal as 
well as a planographic 
intervention, whereby even 
data that has been 
overwritten continues to 
resonate as a result of the 
ongoing oscillation of the 
magnetic field«. (M 66) 
Computer forensics can often 
access this material ›shadow‹ 
of bits and thus challenge 
the idea of the immateriality 
of data. 
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around the preservation of digital texts: if handwritten manuscripts are kept as documents 
of the development of a text, would it then not also be useful to keep the computer 
systems authors used to write digital texts? (Emerson is head of the Media Archaeology Lab, 
Kirschenbaum is director of the Deena Larsen Collection.) How to ensure digital artworks 
will still be accessible in the future? (cf. Buckland, »What is a document?«) 
    In a recent exhibition on Flusser’s influence on the arts, much care was taken to recreate 
a computer set-up one might have used to read his text »Schrift. Hat Schreiben eine Zu- 
kunft?« (translated into English in 2011 as »Does Writing Have a Future«).  The essay  
was first published in 1987 exclusively as a digital text stored on a floppy disk (Bodenlos.).
    Flusser chose this form to reflect the matter of concern of the text: The software on the 
disk that renders it readable for humans eyes could also be used to edit it; and as Flusser re- 
garded it to be in flux, he encouraged his readers to do so. (Berning 134.48) The first 
printed version of the text came out in 1992. However, whereas the book is still widely 
available, accessing the digitally encoded version now requires computer historical skills 
and access to outdated equipment. The text on the disk is no longer in flux but rather en- 
tombed. 
    Flusser’s text file could thus be regarded as an example showing how the persistent be- 
lief that ideas can be ›saved‹ untethered from a material substrate will likely turn out  
to be a wishful fantasy.  The digital storage devices which are metaphorically described as 
›memory‹ often reliably become incompatible with newer equipment. Kirschenbaum’s  
and Emerson’s media labs are attempts to find practical frameworks to ensure the devices 
used to write, store and display digital data are preserved in order to prevent them from 
becoming silent ruins. By maintaining obsolescent computer systems as functional histori- 
cal artifacts, they help to keep digital information alive as memory by keeping it accessible. 
    Another strand of media archeology is concerned with the »deep time« of media —  
the attempt to understand how all contemporary digital media incorporate thousands of 
years of cultural development (Siegfried Zielinski, Wolfgang Ernst) and how the devices 
that propagate a sense of acceleration are made from unearthed archaic materials formed 
in geological processes over the course of millions of years (Jussi Parikka, Erkki Huhtamo).
In the appendix to his book »A Geology of Media«, titled »Zombie Media«, Jussi Parikka, 
together with the artist and researcher Garnet Hertz, proposes media archeology as an art 
methodology, an »alternative archaeology of tinkering, remixing, and collage« that »would 
not start from Duchamp and others but from opening up the technological gadget, the 
screen, and the system.« (151) They do believe that »media never die: they decay, rot, re- 
form, remix, and get historicized, reinterpreted, and collected.  They either stay as a residue 
in the soil and as toxic living dead media or are reappropriated through artistic tinkering 
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 overleaf: installation shot of Henrik Olesen’s /I Do Not Go to Work Today.  
I Don’t Think I Go Tomorrow/ (2010)
For this series of works, Olesen disassembled various digital tools: his 
laptop computer, a digital camera and a photo printer. He neatly arranged 
the components on large acrylic and chipboard sheets in an anatomical 
manner. Each single thing the device consists of becomes visible, revealing 
interdependencies between pieces, but mainly just leaving the viewer puzzled 
how all those parts connect to become functional. Olesen’s analytic 
disassembly turns the devices into ruins: As the material body that sustains 
their function is revealed, this function is lost.
The title ironically reflects how deeply dependent Olesen is on the operation 
of these devices. Indeed, most work today will at some level involve 
handling digital data. The act of unpacking the device one relies on could 
thus be understood as a slight subversion, a reclaiming of one’s capability 
to make decisions, nevertheless. (b)
methodologies.« (153) Parikka and Hertz regard this emanci- 
pation through appropriation of the physical ruins of digital 
black boxes as a way to gain a deeper understanding of how 
these devices are enmeshed with human subjectivity; how they 
manage and inform how we relate to the world. 
    Looking at a broken computer, I predominantly feel the ab- 
sence of its performance that I am used to. It is a feeling of  
a disappointed expectation. I use computers because of the di- 
gital objects they conjure: this text here, the app on my 
smartphone that helps me to get home, the EPUBs of the 
papers I quote from, videos of kittens, my music files... 7
    A broken computer severs me from such conjurings.  A chair 
with one of its legs missing or a hammer without a handle are 
obsolete in a very different way.  They lack the inherent 
emptiness of a computer, which, if it functions, becomes a stage 
on which bits act out information, broadcasting meaning. What 
I realize are the effects of this performance.  They are emitted  
by interfaces that my senses are compatible with and have 
become habituated to. What factually, physically, causes those 
effects remains hidden from my comprehension in the black 
box of the computer. 
In a promotional video, Apple’s Chief Design Officer 
Jonathan Ives introduced the original iPad in 2010 by 
stating: »You know, it is true: When something exceeds 
your ability to understand how it works it sort of 
becomes magical — and that is exactly what the iPad is« 
(Apple, 0:00-0:12). Maybe this slight attenuation of 
the computer’s magic pinpoints the contemporary 
phenomenological condition of the computer’s »secret 
with no mystery«: we know that it is not magical, but 
we cannot but experience it as if it were.
A broken computer does not reveal how this black box works; 
there is no way to pry it open. However, as it confronts me  
with the suddenly apparent physical excess of its broken empti- 
ness, I may grasp the contingent nature of digital objects (cf. 
7 For Yuk Hui, digital 
objects are necessarily 
networked, he defines them 
as »objects on the Web, such 
as YouTube videos, Facebook 
profiles, Flickr images, and 
so forth, that are composed 
of data and formalized 
by schemes or ontologies 
that one can generalize as 
metadata.« (380) He notes 
that the internet »is acting 
both as an interface between 
users and digital objects and 
as a world in which these 
digital objects conceal and 
reveal — in both physical and 
metaphysical terms.« (381) 
    Jannis Kallinikos, 
Aleksi Aaltonen, and Attila 
Marton »subsume under the 
category of digital objects 
all digital technologies 
and devices and digital 
cultural artifacts such as 
music, video or image.« 
(par. 3); they define the 
main differences of digital 
objects from physical objects 
and other cultural records to 
be their immanent pliability 
(the possibility to edit and 
modify them), interactivity 
(»offering alternative 
pathways along which human 
agents can activate functions 
embedded in the object or 
explore the arrangements of 
information items underlying 
it and the services it 
mediates« (par. 8) ), 
openness (the possibility to 
access and to modify them 
by means of other digital 
objects) and distribution 
(they are »seldom contained 
within a single source or 
institution« (par. 10).) I 
understand digital objects 
as synthesized, discerned 
effects caused by computers.
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Kallinikos, Aaltonen, Marton, par. 8), the vast distance between what I have come to  
desire and rely on and this physical thing effecting it: I may realize my dependence on its 
function and the physical integrity sustaining its ›magic‹.  A fall from grace is fatal for digi- 
tal devices; their ›magic‹ quickly dissipates.  This underwhelming and frustrating encounter 
evokes the existential rift that the fully functioning interface is constantly bridging. Left  
to my own devices, I may realize that all is not lost, that no computer system failure can take 
away my being here, and my constant struggle to make sense — yet. I am all tangled up  
but independent; I am independent not because I am superior, but because I am impotent. 
1.1.2 THE VESSEL 
The objectness and the function of chairs (Arendt 137), chalices (Heidegger Q 6), jugs 
(Heidegger T 164), and hammers (Heidegger B 64) is directly grounded in the formation 
of the material they are made of. Like the paper page, it is manifest and evident.  The 
objectness of a computer, on the other hand, is in my opinion commonly regarded to be  
a necessary evil, as a computer — to refer to Flusser’s idea of ›typification‹ once more —  
is not interesting for being a distinct object in itself, but for its potential to embody this 
certain contingency that I have just tried to describe: the possibility to create and recreate 
infinitely different digital objects.  A computer rather functions as an interchangeable con- 
tainer for fluid effects: While the appearance of the words of this .txt-file would change 
 if I transferred it to other computers of other dimensions, the abstract context of the text 
would stay unchanged. I have learned to trust that the machines do not lose words in 
translation.
    Even though many people have a fond relationship to their devices (cf. Chatfield: »The 
Most Intimate Relationship In Your 
Life: Your Smartphone«), the compu- 
ter’s ability to turn data into ex- 
periences is usually regarded to be of 
much higher value than the sub- 
stitutable thing holding and presenting 
this data. 8  An iPad is an iPad is a 
computer... However, no matter how 
exchangeable, the individual computer 
is not at all insubstantial. Every com- 
puter is a material manifestation of the 
mathematical model of the universal 
8 For the book /The Comfort of Things/ the anthro- 
pologists Daniel Miller and Fiona Parrot conducted 
extensive interviews with people living in an ›ordinary‹ 
street in south London. Visiting their homes, they tried 
to understand how things mirror and inform how people 
express who they are, and how they use them to relate 
to others. Miller states that the book »grew out of  
a desire to demonstrate that the humanity of people we 
encountered [...] could be revealed by their material 
possessions.« (300) The primary research was completed 
in Sept 2005 (ibid.) — thus Miller and Parrot just missed 
the rise of smartphones and social media (a topic  
Miller is now researching). However, in Portrait 6, »The 
Aboriginal Laptop«, we get to know Malcolm, who, con- 
stantly moving between Australia and the UK, is most at 
home in the order of his computer: >>> 
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Turing machine, a machine that »when fed with the instructions of any other machine, 
can effectively imitate it« (Dyson 5; cf. Kittler S).  This abstract model exists as a concept 
and thus does not itself presuppose any 
concrete material instantiation. But 
without a material presence, it cannot 
be made to act. Stuff needs to be 
informed to become functional as a 
receptacle for bits. 9
    Apart from the chips that act like 
Turing machines, a modern com- 
puter, a smartphone for example, 
contains hundreds of components and 
a multitude of materials (Rohrig; 
Brunning).  The embodiment of  
the machine is usually embedded into 
a complex system of sensors and other 
interfaces that either feed it with data 
or emit the results of its calculations  
in translated form (Ince 5f).  The 
surface of a computer and the ways in 
and out of its black box are a concern 
of engineering and design, an issue of 
furnishing what is between me, the 
user (or between another computer), 
and the black box which approximates 
a universal Turing machine. 
    Computers fundamentally rely on 
what Philip E.  Agre defines as the 
›digital abstraction‹, the translation of 
physical signals or things into clearly 
distinguishable binary quantities (90ff). 
Jean-Francois Blanchette notes that 
theoretically anything from »Tinker 
Toys to hydraulic valves« could func- 
tion as a bit. »[A]s long as a material 
can support the basic operations of the 
>>> »Malcolm is a digital man to the core. But he has 
become one not because of any particular technological 
interest or predilection towards the latest gimmicks and 
possibilities. What he relates to and cultivates is 
nothing to do with the mechanical quality of the thing. 
It comes from his discovery that the laptop can 
facilitate the quality of order out of which he has 
built his relationship to people, and most especially 
his relationship to himself. [...] For Malcolm, the 
emergence of the digital resolves his basic contradiction 
of materiality. How can he, at one and the same time, 
both keep things and dispense with them as objects? 
Digital media compress all the sensual objects of the 
world and reduce them to an other-worldly domain, where 
they remain a virtual presence. But that other world has 
its own order and aesthetics. It is not merely an 
alternative medium for the creation of self-archiving. 
Digital media creates its own sensual field, of text 
complemented by visual materials and sound. It can 
respect the larger integrity of connections between the 
media it incorporates.« (68) 
9 Turing himself famously illustrated the mode of 
operation of this machine using the metaphor of a 
»›tape‹ (the analogue of paper) running through it, and 
divided into sections (called ›squares‹) each capable 
of bearing a ›symbol‹.« The symbols are written or 
erased, one at the time, by a computer (for example 
by a person), according to a fixed table of rules (the 
programme)« (231). In this manner, tasks can be divided 
into smallest steps and expressed as an executable 
algorithm. Joseph Weizenbaum resorted to toilet paper 
and black and white stones to explain the workings 
of the machine (51f) —>IMAGE (A). The first published 
description of a computer using the stored program 
concept (cf. Dyson 78), John von Neumann’s 1945 »First 
Draft of a Report on the EDVAC«, stresses that it 
requires a physical representation of bits in order 
to operate: »Instructions must be given in some form 
which the device can sense: Punched into a system of 
punch cards or on teletype tape, magnetically impressed 
on steel tape or wire, photographically impressed on 
motion picture film, wired into one or more fixed or 
exchangeable plug 
boards — this list 
being by no means 
necessarily complete« 
(von Neumann 1.2).
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digital abstraction, it can be used as the basis for a computing system« (11). Instead of Tinker 
Toys, a modern computing device usually embodies the bits it is computing with as a 
discrete presence or absence of electrons. Bits are »represented by an electrical voltage or 
current pulse, or by the electrical state of a flip-flop circuit.« (»Bit«) 
    To make the chips of a modern computer, silicon is informed to become a framework, a 
realm of pure mathematical abstraction in which the »distinction between numbers  
that mean things and numbers that do things« (Dyson ix) is dissolved. Bits are not called 
into existence to just self-sufficiently be, but only to do something; they are regarded as 
bodiless signifiers, their substance is insignificant to the mathematical model, they mediate 
and ›flow‹.  The material reality of a computer, its thingness, is built around this compelling 
mathematical abstraction. It is a complex enclosure of empty space that contains and 
conducts electrons. 
A computer is a vessel. 
Electrons pour into the computer and pulse through its chips at ever increasing frequen- 
cies. With every beat the Turing machine reads a symbol, a bit, an electrical state, and acts 
according to the instructions of the program. It either erases and rewrites it, by changing 
an electrical state, or interprets it as an indicator to look at another symbol, another 
electrical state, someplace else. In the process, electrons are channeled and guided through 
funnels, are contained in bulges (as ›memory‹), or are poured out again, sending an impulse 
to the liquid crystals in the screen, telling the speaker to produce a sound, ordering the 
hard disk to translate a current into a magnetic charge, or regulating the fan so that the 
computer does not overheat... 
    Examining a jug as a prototypical thing, Heidegger concluded that the ›essence‹ of the 
jug, as of things in general, is its Geschenk (T 164).  Albert Hofstadter’s translation of Ge- 
schenk as ›gift‹ is somewhat deficient: the word stems from the verb schenken which indeed 
only translates as »to make a gift«. However, it contains, like a residue, an older etymo-
logical layer that refers to the act of pouring, which is still present in the noun Schenke, an 
old-fashioned word for ›tavern‹, ›inn‹, ›pub‹, for »a place where drinks are poured«, or the 
common verbs einschenken and ausschenken which both only relate to the act of »pouring a 
drink«.  The act of welcoming someone by giving her or him a drink is supposed to be the 
reason for this shift in meaning (»schenken«). Schenken — in the way Heidegger used 
it — thus is not just the act of giving, but also implies pouring (a drink).  The German word 
for ›the outpouring‹, which Heidegger employed to define the function of the jug, is Guss. 
The Guss is what the jug is capable of.  Although the verb gießen, from which Guss stems,  
is the clearest translation of ›to pour‹, schenken — the way Heidegger uses it — has a stronger 
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 overleaf: Still from Hito Steyerl’s /Liquidity Inc./ (digital video, 30min. 
2014)
Hito Steyerl’s experimental film begins with an inspirational quote from 
Bruce Lee: »Empty your mind, be formless, shapeless like water, if you  
put water in the cup it becomes the cup, you put water into a bottle and  
it becomes the bottle, you put it into a teapot,  it becomes the teapot.  
Now water can flow or it can crash. Be water my friend.« Steyerl uses  
the contemporary aesthetics of graphical user interfaces to evoke the changed 
status of objects: they are no longer solid and fixed points to position 
oneself amongst, but increasingly considered as fluid realities, demanding 
humans to respond fluidly as well. (c)
implication that someone is actively pouring (and giving): ausgießen is simply »to pour  
out something«, also »to discard liquid«, ausschenken is ›to pour [a drink]‹ (in order)  
›to serve‹; gießen thus emphasizes that which is poured, not who or what is pouring. For 
Heidegger the Guss is passive, it is that which the jug holds and which can be poured  
out.  The Geschenk, literally »that which has been given / poured«, is that which is — 
 actively — gathering together to bring the jug into being as a jug, that which thus enables 
the jugs potential to pour, or to give the Guss. For Heidegger this gathering and uniting  
is the essence of all things. 
    Just as liquids can be poured from one container to another, the bits that cause the 
existence of digital objects can be fluidly exchanged between different computers. So if  
a computer could be understood as a vessel, and its Guss, its outpouring, as the effects 
caused by the electrons pulsing in and through and out of the black box it embodies,  
then, with Heidegger, the essence of the thing that a computer is, its Geschenk, would be 
that which gathers and unites the metaphysical idea of the Turing machine with the hu- 
man ingenuity realizing it, using materials extracted from the earth. 10
    Geschenk, like Gestell (see 5), is a collective noun. It denotes the outcome of a com- 
pleted passive action: something has been done by someone or something, resulting in the  
presence of the signified thing. By pointing at the result of a (transformative) action,  
the word names this action; it does not, however, reveal who or what was acting.  Yet, as  
the signified thing reveals itself to be a result of the named action, it indirectly refers to the 
forces that have caused its existence. Heidegger used this as a way into the metaphysical:  
in what could be understood as ontological forensics, he tried to verbally grasp the forces 
that bring things into being by retracing how these forces cause the becoming of things;  
he named and described them by looking at being as completed becoming, as »that which 
has been been«.  Things, according to Heidegger, are not at all  
as fixed and passive as they might seem. Rather, he regards them  
to be consequences of constant becoming, gathering, and dis- 
persing.  This approach very much resonates with Walter Benjamin’s 
idea of the »language of things« (Benjamin S), which Hito Steyerl 
refers to in her essay »A Thing Like You And Me« as follows: 
In this perspective, a thing is never just an object, but a fossil in which  
a constellation of forces is petrified.  Things are never just inert objects, 
passive items, or lifeless shucks, but consist of tensions, forces, hidden 
powers, all being constantly exchanged. While this opinion borders on 
magical thought, according to which things are invested with super- 
10 The outpouring of digital 
devices requires much more 
than shaping clay into a 
jug: To produce one e-reader, 
approximately thirty-three 
pounds of minerals have  
to be extracted (Goleman and 
Norris; figure from 2011); a 
study found that many rare 
earths necessary to manu- 
facture smart devices are not 
substitutable — there is as 
yet no answer as to what to 
do when natural resources 
will be depleted (Graedel et 
al.). 
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natural powers, it is also a classical materialist take. Because the commodity, too, is understood not 
as a simple object, but a condensation of social forces. (Steyerl T)
Bruno Latour describes this in yet another way: to dissolve the rigidity of the subject-
object binary, he stresses how both actively shape each other by acting upon each other. 
He regards them as equal ›actants‹.  The acting object (which could be understood as  
the resisting or insisting object, the noncompliant, crumpled page, or the jug holding and 
giving the outpouring), has no fixed and rigid existence but is rather, as for Heidegger  
and Benjamin, constantly shaped through its interactions and dependencies. It only exists 
because it is embedded in a fluid network of relations to other (human and non-human) 
objects, because it is being »gathered« (cf. Latour C 75). 
    Thus a computer can be understood as a manifestation of a thought, a precipitation of  
an idea or in other words, still: a constellation of the forces that bring it into existence. Just 
as it does not seem to matter from which kind of container a drink is poured, the com- 
puter is regarded to be a supposedly interchangeable and thus objective vessel. Its outpouring 
is caused by bits whose physical existence is generally considered to be insignificant. But 
how can something be poured if there is no thing to contain it? Who is pouring, and why?
1.1.3  THE WINDOW   
Graphical user interfaces have ›windows‹ that are made from code.  They are made to be like 
windows but they cannot be the thing that a window is, the thing that cannot be fully 
grasped by language. Microsoft’s operating system ›Windows‹ may be the most well-known 
play on this metaphor. 11
    Windows are peculiar things.  They frame a sheet of glass, which thanks to its thingness, its 
existence as a solid thing, shields me from the outside world, muffling sound, keeping  
out the wind and cold; and yet, due to its transparency, I can look through the pane of the 
window as if it was not there at all. My gaze may pass, but my hands cannot.  The light 
shining through the glass into this transparently enclosed inside hits 
my eyes; I see whatever reflected or emitted it, but I am separated 
from it. 
    For some years glass has been used again in computer displays 
after it had disappeared almost completely when the curved 
cathode ray tube monitors were superseded by flat, glassless and 
predominantly matte LCD screens in the mid-2000s (Simmons).  
As multi-touch devices such as smartphones and tablet computers 
11 However, the company was 
not the first to implement 
the visual language of the 
window into a graphical user 
interface. Xerox did so first 
in 1973 (Xerox Alto), 
followed by Apple in 1983 
(Lisa). The first version on 
Microsoft Windows came out in 
1985 (Reimer). 
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became a prevalent way in which to interact with digital objects, users quickly got used to 
do so by tapping, pinching or swiping on the glass that now covers the display.  This glass  
is a substrate for a transparent coating used to measure where it is touched, to digitize 
touch (Brunning).  The same technique is used in the trackpad on the Apple MacBook 
Pro I am writing this text on; it is covered by glass, too (Macari).  To match the glossy 
aesthetics of smart handheld devices, glass panes now also often cover the previously matte 
screens.  The light emitted by the screen on which I see the shadowy letters I type passes 
through a pane of glass, just like the sunlight passes the window of my studio. 
    However, when I look at the writing on the screen in front of me, I do not look into 
an outside world. When my computer is on, the screen becomes an ever-changing sur- 
face that grasps my attention; there is no depth, no ›beyond‹ the screen. Still, it carries the 
implication (and hope) that there, within the confines of this rectangle, lay unlimited 
possibilities made accessible to me: a window of opportunity. But when the screen is not 
working, when its light is turned off, the glass of the display instantaneously becomes  
a window that directly faces a dark wall; it turns into a black mirror. 12  All I can re- 
cognize in this sudden darkness are the reflections of things and of myself; as if I was trying 
to look into the dark night through a window from a well-lit room.
    Jonathan Crary identifies a »transitional moment that happens when one shuts off an 
apparatus after having been immersed in any televisual or digital ambience for an extended 
period.  There is a brief interval before the world fully recomposes 
itself into its unthought and unseen familiarity. It is an instant  
of disorientation when one’s immediate surroundings [...] seem 
both vague and oppressive in their time-worn materiality, their 
heaviness, their vulnerability to dilapidation, but also their inflexible 
resistance to being clicked away in an instant. One has the fleeting 
intuition of the disparity between one’s sense of limitless elec- 
tronic connectedness and the enduring constraints of embodiment 
and physical finitude« (»24/7« 88). 
    This brief moment of being lost is another occasion in which  
the rift between objects and things becomes abruptly palpable:  
I continue to exist in space and time — but the context of  
this existence seems radically altered. I no longer observe mediated 
objects from a safe distance, through a window; I am confronted  
with their thingly actuality.  This changed environment requires 
another set of skills and other ways of looking.  The noticeable shift 
between these cognitive states, from one habitualized way of 
12 »Black Mirror« is the 
name of a song by Arcade 
Fire from their 2007 album /
Neon Bible/ and a BBC TV 
series created by Charlie 
Brooker. Both deal with 
this ambiguity of computer 
displays and the influence 
of digital devices on 
society in general. The term 
»black mirror« is another 
name for a »Claude glass«, 
a small, usually slightly 
convex mirror with a tinted 
surface. Named after the 
French landscape painter 
Claude Lorrain, it was widely 
used in the late eighteenth 
and early nineteenth century 
by artists and spectators 
of landscape to make tonal 
values and areas of light 
and shade visible (Maillet).
81
blank
82
recognizing to another, is not effortless. In this fleeting moment of reorientation I might 
catch myself grasping for hold. I might realize how the objects that I require to be  
stable external entities — stars I can situate myself among — are there because I am actively 
re-cognizing them; I can realize them because I have come to understand them; I make 
them into objects by positioning myself, by cognitively distancing myself from them.  
A window could be understood as a manifestation of this cognitive process of distancing. It 
physically sustains a distance; it is an objectification device.
    Oily fingermarks and smudges on the glossy glass, as well as cracked displays, serve as 
reminders of the fact that even ›smart devices‹ are exposed to what Hannah Arendt 
described as »the voracious needs and wants of their living makers and users« (137). 
Objects, she argues »have the function of stabilizing human life, and their objectivity lies  
in the fact that [...] men, their ever-changing nature notwithstanding, can retrieve  
their sameness, that is, their identity, by being related to the same chair and the same table.« 
(ibid.) She concludes: 
Only we who have erected the objectivity of a world of our own from what nature gives us,  
who have built it into the environment of nature so that we are protected from her, can look upon  
nature as something ›objective.‹ Without a world between men and nature, there is eternal 
movement, but no objectivity. (ibid.)
The now ubiquitous digital windows sustain an even greater objectivity than the objects 
Arendt refers to.  The further they appear to be detached from a physical substrate, the 
closer the object seems to my thinking, to become conceptual.  At the same time, through 
this distancing and because of their interactive nature, the objects on the other side of 
the glass seem no longer to be completely severed from me. I have come to believe that I 
have the power to conjure these digital objects into and out of existence, to call up what- 
ever I desire to see. (At least I feel this way until the battery dies 
and I see my own real-world reflection again.) 13
    Instead of having to deal with the harsh reality of inexorable 
things, computers are believed to create a reality in which one  
can access, manage and control things by means of seemingly 
disembodied information. Just like windows, computers suggest 
that there is an outside world that can be observed from a  
safe distance. On a practical level, with the ubiquity of computers, 
digital objects are treated and used as if they were conceptual 
entities every day; they have become functionally immaterial. Now, 
the move from considering computers as single entities to 
13 Sometimes, I might also 
realize how the limits of 
this alleged freedom are the 
limits of the graphical 
interfaces I grew habitu- 
alized to (cf. Chun H). Lori 
Emerson stresses how the 
frame of the graphical inter- 
face does not just enable 
but also restrict human 
agency; she argues that they 
necessarily entail an ›ideo- 
logy of the user-friendly.‹ 
(47) 
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 overleaf: still from Jon Rafman’s /Still Life (Betamale)/ (digital video, 
4min54sec. 2013) (d)
understanding them as nodes in a vast network consolidates the idea that the romantic wish 
to merge the imagined and the real has become a reality:
    In his 2013 film Still Life (Betamale) Jon Rafman examines this romantic gaze through di- 
gital windows.  A digitally distorted voice tells us: »You see the things that were inside you. 
This is the womb, the original site of the imagination.  You do not move your eyes from the 
screen, you have become invisible« (0:32).  The film is a relentless stream of disturbing 
images and short clips that Rafman found online, mostly on the website 4chan.org, an 
English language imageboard on which users post anonymously (Rafman SL; 4chan). He 
combined these images with ethereal electronic music by Oneohtrix Point Never and a 
spoken text reflecting this contemporary state of cognitive-computational entanglement. 
The images and videos are a digital curdling of bizarre desires.  Their digitality is a 
prerequisite of  
how they came into being and how they exist.  They are puzzling explications of an endless, 
obsessive stream of consciousness, captured fragments of the weird visual overload of 
obsessive computer users.  There are many images of revoltingly filthy computer equip- 
ment; others show people in animal costumes, more or less erotic 8-bit manga animations, a 
smiling cartoon bunny laying on his back, lifting up his legs, presenting his anus; there are 
more people in costumes posing in front of the camera; later still, more manga fetish 
fantasies, and more images of filthy computer equipment, now layered on top of each other, 
partially transparent and seen in fast succession, too fast to really grasp.
    In this short but challenging piece, Rafman encapsulates what could be understood as 
the digital human condition.  The film pinpoints how the computer is not just a cold, 
rational and objective vessel for electrons, but also a perfectly transparent projection screen, 
a window through which almost any dream imaginable can be observed. Rafman illumi- 
nates the human longing that makes the thingness of the computer transparent.  The 
interface effects produced by the computer have the power to convince the user that there 
is another side, a cyberspace that seems to exist independently from the computer’s 
existence as a thing. By pulling this bewildering footage from seemingly bottomless con- 
tainers — the servers that make up the internet — Rafman succeeds in capturing an 
escapist impulse — that by means of digital objects, one might be able to relieve oneself of 
the burdens of this embodied, thingly existence, to transcend from reality into a purely 
conceptual sphere.  The first sentence we hear the soft voice speak is: »As you look at the 
screen, it is possible to believe you are gazing into eternity.« 14> 
    Hito Steyerl opposes this experience of digital transparency. She stresses that the image 
on the screen is »a thing simultaneously couched in affect and availability, a fetish made  
of crystals and electricity, animated by our wishes and fears — a perfect embodiment of its 
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 overleaf: still from Hito Steyerl’s /STRIKE/ (digital video, 28sec. 2010)
The video consists of two takes. First, we briefly see a close-up of the 
artist. She looks calm and resolute. She begins to walk. She is then  
shown in profile. We see that she is walking towards a large flat screen  
TV. The screen is black. Steyerl holds a chisel up to the screen and quick- 
ly strikes it with a hammer. The glass of the screen breaks. The colour- 
ful lines that become visible reveal that it was turned on all along. Its 
transparency is lost through a brief moment of violence. (e)

 overleaf: two images from Tilman Hornig’s series /GlassPhone/ (object and 
digital photographs. 2014)
Hornig’s ›portable and applied sculpture‹ is a thick piece of glass with 
rounded edges. It has the size of a large smartphone or a small tablet 
computer. The documentation of the device show people holding this piece of 
glass as if it was indeed a smart device; we see hands touching and tapping. 
This is not a window, it is a useless object. But its empty presence reveals 
how deeply integrated into everyday life these devices have become in such  
a short time; they are placeholders, tools to ›look through‹ at digital 
objects that somehow feel as if they exist in another time and space. (f)
own conditions of existence. [...] It doesn’t represent reality. It is a fragment of the real 
world. It is a thing just like any other — a thing like you and me.« (Steyerl T) For Steyerl, 
digital images are necessarily embodied entities.  Thus, the images in Rafman’s video are not 
just imaginations, they are really there, a result of the physicality of the computer and  
its workings. They exist outside of the observer, and they remain physically present even  
if no subject is looking at them, 
though to be meaningful they have 
to be seen and under- 
stood.  The images of encrusted 
keyboards in Rafman’s film suggests 
that no matter how immersed in 
digital reality the person in front of 
the screen may be, they are still 
tangled up in things.  These images 
document that the objects on the 
screen are sustained by human 
existence. Rafman shows inhabited 
ruins, the real, dirty traces of com- 
plete self-oblivion.  
In Fiona Apple’s song »Win- 
dow«, the lyrical I notices 
that »It wasn’t the outside 
world I could see  Just  
the filthy pane that I was 
looking through« (0:27). 
What does one see if looking 
through the pane without 
being able to see the out- 
side world behind it? (cf. 
Byatt 2) How filthy does  
a window need to get before 
one realizes that it is not 
transparent anymore?
No matter how deeply immersed a 
computer user might be in the 
14 Artists such as Cory Arcangel, Ryan Trecartin, Ed  
Atkins or Simon Denny are also investigating in this 
aesthetic of the digital human condition; they each use 
very different approaches and techniques to pin it down:  
a physically hacked game cartridge combines classic ro- 
mantic longing with the nostalgia of obsolete 8-bit video 
games (Arcangel, »Super Mario Clouds«, 2002), an immersive 
environment of multi-channel video catching the almost 
unbearably shrill and cacophonic exaggeration and acceler- 
ation of contemporary conversations made void of any  
real content (Trecartin, »Site Visit«, 2014), the eeriness 
of a lost and lonely virtual naked body (Atkins, »Ribbons«, 
2014) or the appropriation of the sleek look of inter- 
net businesses (Denny, »All you need is data: the DLD 2012 
Conference REDUX rerun«, 2013). 
    Indeed, there is a growing interest in what James 
Bridle (in lack of a better description) has coined  
»New Aesthetic«, the often uncanny feedback of computer 
generated imagery into human experience even beyond digital 
devices (Bridle). However, digital glitches or gifs are no 
longer geekish »deviant art« but have become an accepted 
mainstream style used in memes and advertising (Snoad). 
Bruce Sterling partly foresaw this development. Even though 
he lauded the »New Aesthetic« as a »genuine aesthetic 
movement« that had »a promising start« and »touched some- 
thing new, true and real«, he also heavily criticized its 
proponents for eventually simply installing new metaphors 
for old ones and thus failing to truly critically engage 
with what they are concerned with: »When computers first 
shoved their way into analog reality, they came surrounded 
by a host of poetic metaphors. [...] [T]hey were anthro- 
pomorphized and described as having ›thought‹, ›memory‹, and 
nowadays ›sight‹ and ›hearing‹. Those metaphors are de- 
ceptive. These are the mental chains of the old aesthetic, 
these are the iron bars of oppression we cannot see. Modern 
creatives who want to work in good faith will have to fully 
disengage from the older generation’s mythos of phantoms, 
and masterfully grasp the genuine nature of their own cre- 
ative tools and platforms.«  He wishes for a more rigorous 
examination of this rich visual language: »A sincere New 
Aesthetic would be a valiant, comprehensive effort to truly 
and sincerely engage with machine-generated imagery — not as 
a freak-show, a metaphor or a stimulus to the 
imagination — but *as it exists.* The real deal, down to the 
scraped-metal chip surface, if necessary.« (Sterling, n.p.) 
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effects of the machine, sooner or later they have to step away from the screen, to sleep, for 
example
Thus, the transitive moments Crary described remain inevitable disruptive occasions.
  [Smartphones still need to be charged,  
   power can fail,  
   chargers are forgotten at home, 
   hearts can suddenly stop beating 
   …] 
In these moments, when the effects of the machine are disconnected from the objects they 
are recognized as, the computer becomes objective in Arendt’s sense again. It seems 
essentially distant, a Gestell, a set framework — or a window frame — made to fit our under- 
standing, animated by the desires it is fueling.
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 overleaf: still from The Otolith Group’s /The Radiant/ (digital video,  
64min. 2012) 
/The Radiant/ is a film essay that explores the aftermath of the events of  
11 March 2011, when a large undersea earthquake 43 miles off the east coast 
of Japan caused a tsunami that killed thousands of people and led to melt- 
downs of three nuclear reactors at the Fukushima I Nuclear Power Plant.  
The film investigates ways to communicate the phenomenologically ungraspable 
power of radioactivity. It draws on historic news reels, interviews and 
found footage. The image shows a still of a sequence in which we see  
a woman carefully disassembling a digital camera. She attentively looks at 
each piece. The production of the digital image through the interplay  
of these parts is as impossible to comprehend as the very real effects of 
radioactivity; both escape our senses. (g)

 overleaf: image from Jon Rafman’s /9 Eyes/-tumblr (collection of digital 
images. 2009)  
Rafman’s series is a different take on street-photography: Instead of going 
out himself, he browsed Google Street View, looking for serendipitous moments 
that had already been captured by the nine cameras mounted onto the cars 
Google sent out into the streets of the world in pursuit of the company’s 
aim to »organize the world’s information and make it universally accessible 
and useful.« (Google) (h)
1.2  ENTERING THE COMPUTER. OR: INSCRIPTIONS  OF 
FIRST AND SECOND ORDER
The German word Gegenstand that Arendt used to emphasize the (active) »standing against« 
that causes the durability of objects can hardly be used to describe the digital objects  
that reveal themselves behind the glass of the display.  They are, as Friedrich Kittler put it, 
»surface effects« (Kittler G 1f); they do not stand solidly and fixed, they pulsate and flicker. 
Arendt’s concept of the stabilizing quality of enduring objects is being called into question 
by the (postmodern) idea that objects are rather related to abstract concepts of language: 
that they are signs, written and communicated in a permanent process of construction and 
reconstruction; that they exist independently from the thing that sustains them.  The com- 
puter seems to be a perfect reading and writing tool. It registers and equalizes the things  
in the world by translating them into binary code; it promises to make them accessible and 
malleable as a text; every thing is turned into a calculable media phenomenon, a matter of 
language. 15
    Kittler noted that the »general digitization of channels and information erases the differ- 
ences among individual media. [...] Inside the computers themselves everything becomes  
a number: quantity without image, sound, or voice.  And once optical fibre networks  
turn formerly distinct data flows into a standardized series of digitized numbers, any medi-
um can be translated into any other« (ibid.). But then, again, what happens when the 
existence of things suddenly disrupts the abstract grammar of conceptualized objects; when  
the data centre in which this text is remotely stored is hit by a meteor, when you »get 
bopped on the head by a falling nut« (Brown 3f)?
    The successful embodiment of the idea of the universal Turing 
machine and its effects establish a compelling rhetoric of bodi- 
less signifiers: like the writing on the page, the writing of the com- 
puter is presumed to transcend its material instantiation; however, 
digital inscription is not a literal in-formation of some thing, it is 
writing in a system that has been informed, inscribed to function as 
a Turing machine. Kirschenbaum notes that »computers are unique 
in the history of writing technologies in that they present a pre- 
meditated material environment built and engineered to propagate 
an illusion of immateriality« (M 135).  
    
   From this perspective, the digital object I am writing right now — 
 the text I see here — is not considered to have a very different status 
15 As computers and com- 
putation have become in- 
creasingly ubiquitous, every 
aspect of media has been 
greatly affected by digital- 
ization, and something that 
might not necessarily had 
been considered a media 
phenomenon before has since 
probably already been turned 
into one by means of digi- 
talization --the steps I made 
(recorded by a smart-watch 
pedometer), the last trips I 
took using public transport 
(saved on my Oyster Card), 
the seagulls (captured by a 
Google Street View camera)... 
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as this individual printed and bound book, which bears the weight of gravity, catches dust 
or its scanned version. Digital objects are regarded as translations of immaterial patterns  
of bits that can be handled and transferred without friction, bodiless writing that can be re- 
trieved allegedly anywhere, anytime, a combination of flipped and unflipped switches: 
»identification without ambiguity, transmission without loss, repetition without origina- 
lity«, as Kirschenbaum puts it (M 11). In this logic, the book is just one more translation  
of this pattern. Its status as a thing, the choices of font, or of paper, are rendered irrelevant;  
the idea of the text is thought to exist independently from its embodiment.  The accessi- 
bility of digital texts is commonly understood to be rather a question of format than 
of substance.  Therefore this concrete physical object, the thing I am writing on right  
now, has become exchangeable. It is no longer anything like Arendt’s enduring and with- 
standing table and chair, but rather regarded as but one portal, one interface, one of many 
ways to access this text. 
[this sentence here, for example, boss written buy dictating it into my 
computer.]
There is no manuscript that could accidentally burn.  Things seem to do not to matter 
anymore. 
In June 2014, a large bitcoin mine, a facility hosting computers that produce 
the crypto-currency by solving complex mathematical puzzles, went up in flames 
in Thailand; the heat from the computers is believed to have caused the fire 
(Chibber).
To use Heidegger’s terms: the digital Gestell challenges the material. ›Dumb‹ sand is re- 
garded as a resource (Bestand) that is refined (bestellt, ›cultivated‹) into silicon. Silicon  
is forcefully inscribed (›cultivated‹ once more) in order to encase the abstract idea of  
the Turing machine; it is made compliant to host language. In »There is No Software«, 
Kittler writes about this process of inscription to produce computer chips: 
 The last historical act of writing may well have been the moment when, in the early seventies, Intel 
engineers laid out some dozen square meters of blueprint paper (64 square meters, in the case of 
the later 8086) in order to design the hardware architecture of their first integrated microprocessor. 
This manual layout of two thousand transistors and their interconnections was then miniaturised  
to the size of an actual chip, and, by electro-optical machines, written into silicon layers. Finally, this 
4004 microprocessor found its place in the new desk calculators of Intel’s Japanese customer and 
our postmodern writing scene began. For the hardware complexity of such microprocessors simply 
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discards manual design techniques; in order to lay out the next computer generation, the engineers, 
instead of filling out uncountable meters of blueprint paper, have recourse to Computer Aided De- 
sign, that is, to the geometrical or autorouting powers of the actual generation. (n.p.)
This act of writing, this informing of material, to make it stand ready as a chip that operates 
as a Turing machine, is an inscription of first order. It creates a structured container for  
electrons. By claiming that »software does not exist as a machine-independent faculty« 
(ibid.), Kittler called attention to the fact that software necessarily needs a sustaining 
physical framework.  This framework is commonly known as hardware. In order to make 
the computer do something, to produce digital objects, the abstract, coded instructions  
of software (language) need to be broken down into smallest executable instructions con- 
cerning the individual physical bits by which the machine operates. Only in this trans- 
lated form — as physical bits pulsing in a physical structure — can they result in an effect, 
which then potentially produces a meaning.  Thus software, 
argues Kittler, results in physical effects within a physical sys- 
tem — it is never just abstract, immaterial language. 
    Software, in this sense, can be understood as an inscription of 
second order. It is what goes in and out of the container, the 
material that causes its outpouring Its coded language requires  
the first-order inscription, the structuring of the chip. (The 
paper tape Turing uses as a metaphor to explain the operation of 
a computer is »divided into sections« (Turing 231).) 16
    Questioning the status of digital texts, Kirschenbaum comes 
to differentiate between the forensic material and the formal ma- 
terial of the computer. Building on the forensic idea that »every 
contact leaves a trace« (M 49), he understands forensic material  
to be the invisible and intangible but nevertheless actual physical 
presence of the bits a computer uses to work with (M 70);  
there are, for example, concrete manifestations of this letter   Y    
as electric or magnetic charges on my hard disk, or the hard 
drive of the server where it is automatically transferred and 
saved.  These traces are second-order inscriptions: no new 
switches are made, added or removed, they are just ›flipped‹ on 
or off. Resonating with Flusser’s criticism of »typification«, 
Kirschenbaum states that »forensic materiality rests upon the 
principle of individualization, [...] the idea that no two things in 
16 It is possible to argue 
that the formalization of 
language as software is yet 
another layer of ›culti-
vation‹: it affects the way 
humans interact with the 
world, and the computers 
within it. I will eventually 
adjust my habits and thinking 
to the logic of the machine 
(cf. Kaeser). Building on 
Heidegger’s /Gestell/ that 
causes every thing to be 
regarded as a resource  
(/Bestand/), Albert Borgmann 
refers to this adjustment  
as /device paradigm/. Borg- 
mann uses central heating  
as an example to argue that 
once there is a working 
technological solution in 
place that conveniently 
solves a problem, the comp- 
lexity of the solution seems 
to disappear: heat becomes  
a matter of setting a number 
on the thermostat (Borgmann 
41f). Similarly, a working 
internet connection makes 
accessing texts online seem 
to be a matter of course 
(cf. Blum).
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the physical world are ever exactly alike.« He thus disagrees with many new media theorists 
and opposes the idea »that electronic texts are ephemeral, [...] [or] somehow inherently 
unstable and always open to modification [...], or that electronic texts are always identical 
copies of one another« (M 17).
    Kirschenbaum defines formal material as the result of the interdependencies of the for- 
malized structures of a computer with these physical traces. He identifies both the hard- 
ware and the software as structuring agents that frame and define how physical traces 
become instructions that in turn cause new traces which may then cause meaningful 
effects. He defines »formal material« as »the procedural friction or perceived difference — 
 the torque — as a user shifts from one set of software logics to another.« (M 13) Johanna 
Drucker summarizes his ideas as follows: »forensic materiality refers to evidence, while 
formal materiality refers to the codes and structures of human expression.« 17
    Indeed, in the strange aesthetic of digital glitches and lags between input and output, 
one might still sometimes catch a glimpse of this formal material in operation (P par. 4). 18
    Kirschenbaum points out that this formal material and the illusion of immateriality it 
suggests through its operation can only be sustained by »hyper-redundant error-checking 
routines« (M 12) that constantly deduct any unwanted noise, any irregularities caused by 
the imperfection of the material substrate, from the entropy that results from the com- 
puter’s existence in a contingent world. In this way, writes Blanchette, »computers can self- 
efface the static — scratches on a record, smudges on paper — that 
typically signals the materiality of media« (11). Formal material 
actively protects itself from being corrupted by the unreliable and 
potentially fallible physical support it depends on. Error correction 
aims to ensure reinforced, equalized, perfectly discrete signals that 
can be handled as abstract symbols, as entities that functionally 
transcend into the realm of logic and language and thus no longer 
belong to the physical world.  The workings of the computer thus 
supposedly result in sheer writing, bodiless bit-patterns used to 
encode complex combinations of symbols which eventually — after 
being processed and altered many times — may turn a screen into a 
window, effect an image, compose a text on the screen, or become 
anything imaginable (or not yet imaginable).  As this sheer writing 
distances itself from any substrate, there is nothing to ›crumple‹. It is 
writing with the idea of letters, with the X-ness of X and the 1-ness 
of 1; there are no dots, no curves, no ink, no paper...  
 
18 Kirschenbaum: »Formal 
materiality is perhaps 
also the lingering 
perception of some genuine 
material residue — however 
misplaced — which presents, 
like sensation in a phantom 
limb, when one cannot quite 
accept the exclusively 
formal nature of a digital 
process; for example, the 
vague sense of unease that 
attends me after leaving 
my desktop music player 
application on pause for 
hours on end, something 
that would harm a physical 
tape system because of the 
tension on the reels.« (m13)
17 Footnotes are a product 
of /formal material/, too.
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However, this distancing through writing is caused and sustained by an underlying struc- 
ture, the formal material of the machine.  This structure mediates between the physical 
realities and the abstract realities of the computer. If I was to ›crumple‹ the substrate  
that sustains this functional structure and given that the error-checking routines would  
not be able to recreate the former order, the structure would ›collapse‹, bringing the 
machine to a halt.  The sheer writing of the machine would instantly cease to exist.  
What would remain is the ›crumpled‹ physical substrate of the defunct machine (a ruin) 
bearing forensic traces, inaccessible to human senses.  These traces both formalized this sub- 
strate to function as a Turing machine (first-order inscription), and, within this formal- 
ized structure, constructed the now gone abstracting distancing of the writing (second-
order inscription). 
    In his lectures on »Optical Media«, Kittler, drawing on Flusser’s idea of the »virtual 
abolition of all dimensions«, illustrated how the successful embodiment of the digital ab- 
straction, the cultivation of sand into silicon in order to produce sheer writing, which 
then can be put to use to produce all kinds of effects, encapsulates an historic semiotic de- 
velopment: 
In Flusser’s model, the first symbolic act [...] was to abstract a three-dimensional sign out of the 
four-dimensional continuum of space and time.  This sign stood for the continuum, but because of 
this dimensional reduction it could also be manipulated. Some examples are obelisks, gravestones 
and pyramids.  The second step consisted in signifying this three-dimensional sign through a 
two-dimensional sign. [...] The third step was the replacement or denotation of two-dimensional 
through the alleged one-dimensionality of text or print, which McLuhan’s media theory also 
claims, although all of our book pages since the eleventh century are structured surfaces [...]. 
    What all of these reductions had in common was that the n-1 dimensional signifier at the same 
time also concealed, disguised, and distorted the signified, that is, n dimensional.  This is the reason 
for the polemics of Greek philosophers against gods of flesh and blood, the wars of iconoclasts or 
reformers against religious images, and finally in the modern era, the war of technology and natural 
sciences against a textual concept of reality. In this last war, according to Flusser, one-dimensional 
texts have been replaced by zero-dimensional numbers or bits — the point is that zero dimensions 
do not include any danger of concealment whatsoever. 
    When seen from this perspective, computers represent the successful reduction of all dimensions 
to zero. (O 226f)
Kittler goes on to describe how the computer is used to reverse this reduction to recreate 
two-dimensional or even three-dimensional (considering virtual reality even four-dimen- 
sional) effects out of this zero-dimensionality of binary bits (ibid.). 
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 overleaf: image documenting Sebastian Schmieg’s and Johannes P Osterhoff’s 
project /10kg From the New Factory/ (box containing shredded hard disks. 2014) 
When Schmieg and Osterhoff saw a picture of shredded hard disks in Google’s 
own documentation /Inside our data centers/, they asked the company if they 
could send them a sample of those discarded devices and soon received a full 
box from one of Google’s data centres in Saint-Ghislain, Belgium. The artists 
regard this /stuff/ as showing the fundamental body of the services and 
interfaces Google provides. (i)
In other words: a computer cannot embody or incorporate the things in the world, it can only 
textualize them. It ›solutes‹ and ›resolutes‹ them to reconstruct them as effects; but these 
effects are not self-sufficient, they rely on the computer’s existence as a mediating thing, 
an incorporation. Writing creates distance. Distance may be misunderstood as ob- 
jectivity. 
    Writing about the ontology of digital images, Johanna Drucker refers to this misunder- 
standing as a »mythology in which code passes for truth« (G 145).  According to Drucker,  
it stems from a strong emphasis on form over material in Western philosophy, an attempt  
to find perfect and unambiguous representation of human thought.  This wish to externa- 
lize ideas without having to depend on a material form leads to the concept of mathesis, 
the representation of knowledge in mathematical form (G 141). (Kittler’s explications  
on the abstraction through »symbolic acts« fittingly illustrate this concept.) Drucker oppo- 
ses this notion with the idea of graphesis, »embodied information« (G 142):
If ›form‹ is conceived in mathematical terms, it can be absorbed into an absolute unity of essence 
and representation, while if ›form‹ is conceived in terms of graphesis, then it resists this unity in 
part through the specificity imparted by material embodiment. (145) 
This »specificity« could be the paper this thesis is printed on, the choice to use a dot matrix 
printer to materialize parts of it, the fact that it is printed on A4 paper, or even the fact  
that I wrote it using a computer; it is the actuality of things that constantly disappoints the 
idea of total contingency.
   N. Katherine Hayles finds that the changed status of things, this heightened emphasis on  
objectivity, consequently leads to a problematic concept of what it means to be human — 
 a ›posthuman‹ outlook that »privileges informational pattern over material instantiation« (2). 
Hence the »embodiment in a biological substrate is seen as an accident of history rather 
than an inevitability of life.« A posthuman perspective »configures human being so that it 
can be seamlessly articulated with intelligent machines. In the posthuman, there are no 
essential differences or absolute demarcations between bodily existence and computer simu- 
lation, cybernetic mechanism and biological organism, robot teleology and human goals« 
(3). Hayles’ book »How We Became Posthuman« is an attempt to understand this rhetoric. 
She looks for »what had to be elided, suppressed, and forgotten to make information lose 
its body« (13). 19>
    Mark B Hansen is an avid supporter of Hayles’ critique of both 
the conservative techno-sceptics and those who believe the digital 
can provide means to all ends.  To understand how the human is  
constituted through the technological milieu that surrounds them, 
19 For information theorist 
Luciano Floridi, becoming 
posthuman means becoming an 
›inforg‹ (informational 
organism): »It follows that we 
are witnessing an epochal, >>>  
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he examines the body and its sensory potentials in relation to technical media. In order to 
decenter human sensation, he applies Whitehead’s extended notion of perception, which 
not only encompasses human sensory experience, but radically broadens the idea of  
the subject to all kinds of relational situations: »Whitehead’s expansion of perception takes 
the important step of anchoring perceptions within the material universe where causality reigns. 
For Whitehead, that is, perceptions [...] are never simply subjective creations (»ideas« or 
»impressions«) that transform the fleeting appearances of material reality into certain 
subjective contents; rather, perceptions are themselves caused by the very same kind of shift 
that causes all events in the universe’s becoming.« (48) Looked at this way, twenty-first century 
media (as Hansen distinguishes them) become part of an intricate system of relations of 
human and non-human perceptions; the Kantian Gegenstand loses its solipsistic existence 
as the act of recognition does not happen in a vacuum, set apart from things, but rather 
only because the body is amidst them — as a conscious actant among actants. Hansen finds 
that »neither consciousness-centered nor bodily-centered approaches seem capable of 
grasping the level of materiality and the sensuous heterogeneity at issue in the twenty-
first-century media« (50) as media »impact experience by shaping the ongoing worldly 
production of sensibility that constitutes the sensory confound out of which percep- 
tion proper can in turn arise.« (46) Working »beneath the senses« he argues that twenty-
first-century media »bypass the older mediations via embodiment — the gradual bodily 
estimation of the perceptual — in favor of a more direct, in some sense radically 
disembodied, surrogacy.« (51) In other words: as soon as the thingly 
contemporary digital media operate as intended, they no longer 
just disappear as the individual leaves of paper disappear when they 
are recognized as the pages of a book — a working interface is 
rather designed with the conceptual nature of its content in mind: 
it emits sensations. It is reading itself out loud instead of just waiting 
for someone to read it.  This makes digital data seem somewhat 
arrogant; the limitations of human perception become a burden, a 
handicap that unfortunately needs to be dealt with and which slows 
down the actual processing of the bits as they need to be ex- 
pansively translated.  The content of the screen in front of me could 
thus also be understood as a crutch. 
    Drucker (like Kittler, Hayles, Flusser and Kirschenbaum) regards 
this supposed ideality of digital data, the belief that it is self-
identical and independent of material embodiment, as a highly pro- 
blematic »positivist ideology« (G 141). If the computer was in fact a 
>>> unprecedented migration 
of humanity from its or- 
dinary habitat to the info- 
sphere itself, not least 
because the latter is ab- 
sorbing the former. As  
a result, humans will be in- 
forgs among other (possibly 
artificial) inforgs and agents 
operating in an environment 
that is friendlier to infor- 
mational creatures. Once 
digital immigrants like us 
are replaced by digital 
natives like our children, 
the e-migration will become 
complete and future ge- 
nerations will increasingly 
feel deprived, excluded, 
handicapped, or poor whenever 
they are disconnected from 
the infosphere, like fish out 
of water.« (15) 
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machine that could successfully outsource thinking, and the writing it produces was abstract 
bodiless thought that could be processed and transferred without friction or loss, this 
would preclude »any critical intervention in the investigation of terms of being and their 
reception in cultural frameworks« (ibid.).  There would no longer be a Kantian Gegenstand, 
as digital data would directly and purely represent the recognized object; without ambi- 
guity there are no reasons to question things. However, as Drucker affirms, »[w]hatever the 
›ideality‹ of code may be, even if it were (as it is not yet at least) directly available to senti- 
ence in some unmediated way, it is in the encounter of matter and mind that form is pro- 
duced as thought (and thought as form)« (G 144). 
    Digital data, the writing of the computer, can always just describe something, but it can- 
not be the thing it describes. It always points away from itself, necessarily denying its  
own physical manifestation that hence might be forgotten and ignored, but nevertheless 
lingers on, more or less silently sustaining the digital objects that convince us that they are 
pure and insubstantial. 
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 overleaf: image depicting the delivery of an IBM 305 RAMAC in 1959; its IBM 
350 hard disk unit was capable of storing five megabyte of data..
In his book /Tubes. A journey to the centre of the internet/, Andrew Blum 
recounts the moment when he was presented the actual thing that sits at the 
beginning of the fibre optic cables through which almost all of the data of 
the internet is sent: »So a gig is a billion,” Westesson said, nonchalantly. 
He held in his palm an optical module of a type known as an SFP+, for 
›small form-factor pluggable.‹ It looked like a pack of Wrigley’s gum made 
of steel, felt as dense as lead, and cost as much as a laptop. Inside was a 
laser capable of blinking on and off ten billion times per second, sending 
light through an optical fiber. A ›bit‹ is the basic unit of computing […]. 
That pack of gum could process ten billion of them per second – ten gigabits 
of data.« (Blum ch.5). (THREE)
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(j)
2  
THE CONCERN  
2.1 REVISITING A SENSIBILITY
The idea of the sustaining support in my thesis leans on that of Mel Bochner’s 1970 work 
»No Thought Exists Without A Sustaining Support«, which has been a steady source  
of inspiration for me. We see a rectangle in landscape orientation, painted in black directly 
onto the wall.  The sharp and formal edges on the top and sides contrast with the uneven 
and negligently executed bottom, paint dripped down to the floor.  The title is presented 
as an axiom, written by hand in chalked capitals. We read: 
2. NO THOUGHT / EXISTS / WITHOUT A / SUSTAINING SUPPORT 
Here there is a slightly ironic association of blackboards in schools, of having to memorize 
theorems.  The numeration (»2.«) at the beginning of the text indicates a series.  The work 
numbered as »1.« is a very similar mural that reads: 
1. LANGUAGE / IS NOT / TRANSPARENT 
The sentence is presented using only a limited set of materials: a white wall, black paint, 
and chalk. However, these materials are used very overtly, they become part of the 
writing and remain visible as they are demonstrating the idea they are denoting. Idea  
and form are congruent yet irreconcilable.  All of Bochner’s works can be understood  
as vigorous affirmations of the idea of graphesis: they stress the friction between the 
thingliness of the materials and the concepts they have come to embody. Bochner lets his 
materials perform concepts. He uses them as formal material, demonstrating that things  
can indeed form meaningful constellations, structures that convey language and logic, but 
that they necessarily need to be sustained by things. He shows how reading things as 
conceptual objects always means repressing the materials that have been used to convey 
them. 20>
    Hence, Bochner’s works are engaged in grasping the background of thinking. In accor- 
dance with Edmund Husserl’s notion that consciousness is always »consciousness of some- 
thing«, Bochner aims to emphasize the physical background necessary for understanding, 
the manifest logical structures of knowledge (Siewert 3.; Bois xvi). In writing about  
his work »A Theory of Sculpture«, he identifies the »enormous abyss« that »separates the 
space of statements from the space of objects« (Bochner 145). Instead of bridging this space, 
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 (D) Part of the series 
»Theory of Sculpture: 
Fontana’s light.« Installed 
in 2012 at Marc Selwyn Fine 
Art, Beverly Hills, using 
colourful shards of Murano 
glass which formerly 
belonged to Lucio Fontana.
 
(C) Part of the series 
»Theory of Sculpture«. 
Installed in 2013 at 
Peter Freeman, New York.
 
20 (B) Notecard 
with thoughts on 
the wallwork. 
20
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Bochner makes it the pivot of his concern. For this reason his work has also been labelled 
as post-conceptual.
    The criticism of the term »conceptual art« that Bochner expressed in his text »Excerpts 
from Speculation 1967-1970« very much resonates with Drucker’s arguments against  
the ideal of mathesis: »The unfortunate implication is of a somewhat magical / mystical leap 
from one mode of existence to another« (72). For the conceptual artists, the art object  
was no longer a unique thing (or Gegenstand in the Kantian sense), nor a typified (but still 
physical, external) object that operates as a sign, but a disembodied idea. Suspending  
the process of synthesis, the conceptual art object has been claimed to transcend empirical 
realities — the object of interest is no longer outside the observer, but in the realm of his 
or her cognition (Albero xvi f). Marcel Duchamp was one of the first artists to declare that 
his interest was no longer in »retinal« but in »cerebral« art (Tomkins 
158).  Thus, the conceptual art object is embedded in language; it 
often questions and blurs the border between language and things, 
or is argued to be art as pure, uninstantiated thought. In order to 
realize it, one often has to be able to ›read‹ it. 21 
    This ideal of unfettered objectivity has likewise been proclaimed 
by many cyber-theorists.  The 1994 »Magna Carta for the 
Knowledge Age« begins with declaring that the »central event of 
the 20th century« has been »the overthrow of matter« (MC).  The 
conceptual art object and the digital object are both argued to be 
dematerialized. However, whereas conceptual art mostly grew out 
of a critical concern, from questioning the relationship of the 
subject and the (art) object, and a careful examination of how the 
art object is created through and held by the linguistic and 
institutional structures surrounding it, the structures that become 
the formal material of the computer as it functions have long become 
impenetrable. Like other objects sustained by media, the digital 
object is easily assumed to have a »mystified and abstract identity, 
sundered from any relation to the observer’s position in the 
cognitively unified field« (Crary T 19); there is a cause (I hit a key 
on the keyboard) and an often immediate effect (I see the 
corresponding letter on the screen), but the process causing it has 
become untraceable, as Apple’s Steve Jobs put it: »It just works.« 
(Jobs) 
 
21 This, of course, can only 
be a very rough generali- 
zation. Alexander Alberro’s 
and Blake Stimson’s »Concep- 
tual Art: A Critical An- 
thology« has 624 pages and 
weighs 1359 grams. I carried 
it back and forth between  
my studio and my home often 
enough to know that it would 
be preposterous to summarize 
and equalize all artists  
and ideas put under this 
umbrella term in only a few 
sentences. »Conceptual art« 
itself is a concept; but,  
as Alberro and Stimson have 
worked to show, it produced 
a rich field of evidence. Al- 
berro puts it this way: »In 
its broadest possible defini- 
tion, then, the conceptual in 
art means an expanded cri- 
tique of the cohesiveness and 
materiality of the art 
object, a growing wariness 
toward definitions of artistic 
practice as purely visual, a 
fusion of the work with its 
site and context of display, 
and an increased emphasis on 
the possibilities of public- 
ness and distribution.« 
(Albero xvii)
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 (F) Yuri Pattison’s work is concerned 
with the internet as a physical space 
and the political and visual shifts and 
feedback effects caused by digital- 
ization. For a recent solo show in 
Berlin, he re-enacted the enforced 
physical destruction of hard disks on 
which the files leaked by Edward Snowden 
were stored. The hard disks were in pos- 
session of the /Guardian/. The newspaper 
agreed to destroy the devices after  
it was threatened with legal actions. 
Under the supervision of technicians 
from Government Communications 
Headquarters (GCHQ), a small team of /
Guardian/ staff used angle grinders  
to render the data irretrievable. (Bor- 
ger) Pattison filmed his re-enactment of 
the destruction of a hard disk using a 
USB microscope. Alongside the physical 
ruins he created, he showed the re- 
sulting film as a YouTube clip that is 
streamed on a prototype of Google’s 
Chromebook. 
  
Lastly, (G) Tilman Hornig’s sculptures 
»GlassPhone« and »GlassBook« struck me as 
brilliant puns that encapsulate the notion 
of digital transparency. (See image f on 
smaller page ix)  
 
(E) I met with Marieta Chirulescu, who esta- 
blished a very personal and experimental 
translation process into and out of digital 
images. Her final works are paintings. She 
combines and layers digital images that  
she prints out in various ways, often decisi- 
vely opting for a low quality, she then paints 
over those prints, and scans them in again.  
She moves the image back and forth between her 
computer desktop and easel. She told me  
that the equipment she uses cannot easily be  
replaced. She often relies on very particular 
faults that create effects she includes into her 
images. She also stressed that the fact that 
scanners are not often programmed to auto- 
matically enhance the image they produce and the 
disappearance of poor quality printing makes  
it harder to creatively work with the friction  
of the machine. 
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I am inclined to argue that it is possible to similarly compare Bochner’s post-conceptual 
sensibility, the realization that the art object necessarily relies on a sensuousness of its 
presentation (Barranco 154), with the so-called post-digital condition. Florian Cramer de- 
fines post-digital as »a state in which the disruption brought upon by digital information 
technology has already occurred« (n.p.): ›Cyberspace‹ is no longer regarded to be different 
or other to experience; it is not a magical, futuristic beacon of hope but has become a 
reality of life that, however, is still in many ways unchartered. Just as conceptual art failed 
to completely dematerialize the art object, the advancement of digital media into everyday 
life makes it apparent that things cannot just exist as digital objects; there is always an 
actual residue.  Artists and thinkers embracing the idea of the post-digital now explore this 
space.  They question the difference and distinctions of digital and non-digital objects and 
their respective conceptions, ideologies and politics.  The post-digital sensibility embraces 
plurality; digital objects are increasingly regarded to be but one state of existence, and 
digitalization is no longer automatically equaled to progression.  Thus, post-digital could be 
understood as a term that describes a turn away from the promises of digital contingency, 
the abundance of images and possibilities, and towards the realities of the computer. <22
     I hope to similarly address the abyss between the physical entity of the computer and 
its meaningful effects by revisiting (and partially even re-enacting) the post-conceptual 
sensibility towards things using digital means. But how can the background of thinking, 
the engagement of the consciousness with digital objects, be made practically evident (or 
even manifest) if there is no discernible fixity, no discernible stuff that these objects are 
made from? Bochner manipulated actual things. He arranged pebbles, nuts, and sticks to 
show how they become readable as numbers and embody concepts (Berardini). I cannot 
show the actual physical bits of the computers I am using. I cannot stack electrons; I cannot 
make them manifest while they produce the effects that become recognizable as digital 
objects. I therefore, with knowing futility, try to insert myself into the processes that lead 
to their creation and work among the friction caused by the formal material of the machine. 
I see my practice as exercises in grappling with the evasive body of digital media. I 
translate, transform, and literally in-form things using digital devices. My hands — my own 
digits — are often visible. I aim to create resonances and associations between the 
pieces — broken glass, crumpled and folded paper, format, formalities, frames — in order to 
construct a quasi-didactic setting: The physical entities can easily be linked to the 
seemingly immaterial effects that brought or are still bringing them into being and with 
each other, but these relationships do not ›explain‹ anything.  The mediated body of digital 
media, the structured emptiness of empty containers itself becomes media content. 
Reading is possible but void.  The ›thing‹ in question is a physical structure in operation.
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As Bochner has emphatically demonstrated, things do not speak for themselves, they are 
outside of language. Even though things can be used to ›make sense‹, they remain things, 
they remain present.  This presence, however, is unintelligible. In this sense, I understand 
my practice as an extension of the verbal encircling of the black box established so far, a 
questioning of the ultimately absurd physical substrate that sustains the opaque 
background of the language of digital objects by means of things instead of language. 
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ON CHOOSING THINGS TO WORK WITH
I focused on digital devices that are close to myself, that belong to the everyday experience 
and the setting of my ›home office‹: A4 sheets, laser prints, scanners, my laptop, ebook 
readers… They are readily available for experimentation: I can take them and stack them,  
I can handle them as things. I decided to limit the inquiry of digital things to my subjective 
view as an end-user; to press my nose against the glass of the tablet computer, as it were. 
     During the course of my research I got further drawn towards the aesthetics of scanners 
and laser printers.  They are seldom regarded to have an aesthetic agency and usually 
thought of as neutral or at least utilitarian. I am especially interested in this ›taken-for-
grantedness‹. Just as the body of the book is reconsidered as more and more texts are read 
on screens, the ›naturalized attitude‹ (Zuboff 36; Siewert 3.) towards laser prints is also 
slowly being called into question.  As there are now different, more compelling ways to trans- 
late digital objects, black and white laser prints regain their thingness in their poorer 
quality representations. Just like the 
poor image on the screen (Steyerl 
P), they bear the traces of the formal 
material, the process that brought 
them into existence. I appreciate 
the slight imperfections of the laser 
printers I work with. 23
    A standard A4 printout is an- 
other strange object: it is no longer 
a digital object but is not regarded 
to be a real thing either.  The photo- 
copied / laser-printed page is always 
considered to be a copy. It is not 
thought of as the real thing. How- 
ever, it is a real thing — just as the 
pattern of bits that encode this text 
and the physical interface showing 
representing it in translated 
form. 24>
    I use standard paper sizes (ISO 
216 / DIN 476) to frame and con- 
solidate the works.  25>
23 Gitelman notes that the introduction of the photocopier 
in 1960 quickly changed how people thought about documents. 
Suddenly, everything could be turned into a document by 
placing it on the glass of the machine (102f). But more 
importantly, there was no need for central archives anymore. 
The word on the page became virtual, giving rise to the 
idea of disembodied information.  
Artists quickly explored the new medium. Mel Bochner’s 
Working Drawing and Other Visible Things on Paper Not 
Necessarily Meant to Be Viewed as Art (1966), is an early 
play on McLuhan’s claim that »the xerox machine makes  
every man a publisher« (Bochner W 177). As the New York 
School of Visual Arts Gallery invited him to curate a small 
drawing show and refused to pay for the framing of the 
working drawings he intended to show, he decided to re- 
produce them with the Xerox machine that the school had 
just recently installed. He invited other »intellectual 
workers« to submit other personal working drawings and 
studio notes. To round the number up to 100 he added lists, 
charts and diagrams from a copy of /Scientific American/. He 
turned this convolute into a photocopied edition of four. 
He presented them in four identical loose-leaf notebooks on 
sculpture stands. (ibid.) 
Similarly, /The Xerox Book/, published in 1968 in New York  
by Seth Siegelaub and John W. Wendler, was planned as an  
»exhibition in print«. The  seven artists who were invited — 
 Carl Andre, Robert Barry, Douglas Huebler, Joseph Kosuth, 
Sol LeWitt, Robert Morris, and Lawrence Weiner — were each  
asked to work with the format of the standard paper size 
and the idea of the dissemination of art through a 
photocopied book over 25 pages. (XB)  
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(H) Wolfgang Tillmans used this effect 
variously to call attention to the 
substrate of photographs. For his 
series /Lighter/, he produced abstract 
images by directly exposing photo  
paper to light. After developing them, 
he further foregrounded the paper by 
folding or crumpling it, turning  
the image into an object (Lorch).  
 
(I) Ignacio Uriarte is as fascinated by 
the richness of seemingly bland office 
materials as I am: »In office work too you’d 
be surprised at the pictorial and sculptural 
motions you make« (cf. Giers). For his 
work /Crumpled and Flattened/ he took 
standard A4 sheets of paper, crumpled them, 
flattened them out again and then fixed them 
to the wall in an 11 x 25 grid. When I was 
confronted with this piece at the 
Lenbachhaus in Munich (long after thinking 
up my ›original‹ introduction of this 
thesis), I was struck by how similar our 
sensibility for these matters is. However, 
his perspective is much more poetic than 
mine; where he playfully accentuates office 
materials, I am more interested in their 
media function, in understanding the 
structures that let them become invisible. 
 
(J) Another notable crumpled A4 sheet 
is Martin Creed’s /Work No. 88. A sheet 
of A4 paper crumpled into a ball/ 
 27
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I use both the well-known A-series and the lesser known B-series, which have the same 
aspect ratio but fit exactly between the sizes of the A-series (B4 is between A4 and A3). 
The images in this book that show my practical work are framed by A4 sheets once more; 
they often show other standard sized sheets of paper. Every thing has been scaled to fit 
onto the same pane. 26
    Again, I am fascinated by how natural this standard has become: a drawing of a rectangle 
with the aspect ratio of 1:1,4142 will very likely be associated with paper.  The simple act 
of scaling pages by folding them makes the standard evident as 
formal material: it reveals how the abstract mathematical concept is  
embodied in the paper and that this embodiment matters.  The  
folds at the same time demonstrate the incorporated ratio and re- 
assert the sheets as things.  They can be thought of as an orderly 
version of the crumpled page: They disrupt the idea of the sheet as 
being two-dimensional and let it oscillate between being a flat 
(picture) pane and a self-sufficient, three-dimensional thing. <27
/
During this research project, my angle of questioning has changed 
slightly. I moved from questions and complications on the process 
of (digital) translation (2.2) and the physical act of in-formation 
(2.3), to looking at interfaces as things (2.4). I will describe these 
changes before introducing the practical work it resulted in.
26 The RCA research pro- 
gramme handbook defines 
the framework for this 
thesis. It states: »The 
thesis should be printed on 
white A4 paper between 70g/
m2 and 100g/m2.« (RPH).
24 Those photocopies were 
still analogue electro-
photographs. (The light 
reflected from the object on 
the plate caused the image 
on the image drum.) Today 
all photocopiers contain a 
digital scanner and a digital 
laser printeformerly belonged 
to Lucio Fontana.
25 The international paper 
size standard is based on 
two principles: Firstly, the 
aspect ratio of the page is 
one to the square root of 
two (1:1,4142), secondly, 
the base size (A0) has an 
area of one square meter. 
All smaller sizes derive from 
dividing the sheet in half 
across the longer dimension 
(A1= 0,5 sqm, A2= 0,25 sqm, 
...). If divided this way, 
the aspect ratio will always 
remain the same. (Since the 
advantages of this ratio 
were first noted by Georg 
Friedrich Lichtenberg in 
1786, it is also known as 
the Lichtenberg ratio (Kuhn
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2.2 ON MAKING DIGITAL OBJECTS INTO THINGS
At first I attempted to emphasize the translation of supposedly immaterial bit patterns into 
manifest things, the materialization of digital objects. How can I stress the beauty that  
lays in the banality of printing out a digital text on a laser printer? I hoped to find discern- 
ible or conceptual residues of the formal material of the digital machines I used for these 
processes of translation. However, I came to realize that the successfully transmitted object 
will always be cognitively foregrounded.  As the sustaining support becomes a background, 
it is ›unseen‹; the effect dominates the substrate. It is therefore very likely that an act  
of translation is regarded to be insignificant. Does it really matter what particular scanner 
or printer I use to produce an image? Is the PDF on the screen really that much different 
from its manifestation as a print?
    How to question this supposed insignificance? How to question something that is present 
but not seen?
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EMPTY 
A commercial four colour (CMYK) offset lithograph on greyish recycling paper (115g/
sqm) measuring 520 x 720 mm; edition of one. 
In order to print 
    four crop marks
    four bleed marks, 
    four registration marks, and 
    two colour bars, 
four full-sized aluminium printing plates were developed; a laser translated my PDF-file. 
The sheet moved through the four colour decks of the printing press. If I was to cut the 
sheet according to the delineated marks, I would produce an empty A2 sheet. 
    Printed matter is even more ubiquitous than digital information — it has become com- 
pletely naturalized. I can (and have, for the production of prints for this project) order 
prints more easily and cheaply than ever before. I transfer files and just a few days later re- 
ceive copies of the image I previously viewed on my screen.  The flickering digital object 
becomes a manifest thing, available in abundance.  The time, space and labour, the 
expensiveness of the printing process disappears into a black box; it is compressed. Is there 
a way to grasp the ›ghost in the machine‹ that makes the marks I saw on the screen only  
a short while ago appear on this sheet of paper (cf. Ryle 5f)? Could it be that it is still pre- 
sent, captured in this gathering? 28 ( -> APPENDIX A)
28 A printer told me how 
diagnostics and even repairs 
are now done by proxy — if  
a machine has a failure, it 
instantly sends a report to 
a service team over the web. 
The printer in the facility 
may then receive instructions 
of what to do, or sometimes 
the fault can be resolved 
from afar. The machines have 
become so fast and complex 
that the operator does not 
and cannot fully understand 
their workings anymore. 
(Wuenderlich and Pfeffer 1
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SNOW
A lino-cut, measuring 1.5 × 2 m, printed on Tyvek.
    After the winter of 2009 / 2010, the snow did not melt for months in Berlin. Every 
time it looked like it was about to disappear, it snowed again.  This resulted in massive 
heaps of grit mixed with cleared icy precipitation everywhere. When these heaps  
were finally and ultimately depleting by mid-April, they became a relentlessly factual, dirty 
grey-and-brown return of repressed material.  The snow almost gone, they were now al- 
most entirely made of grit but also revealed all the debris of outdoor city life: dog 
droppings, the burnt remainders of fireworks from New Year’s Eve, bottles, cigarette butts... 
dirt and rubbish of all kinds that could not be cleared away because it had been blanketed 
by snow for so long. I took many (digital) photographs, but was uncertain what to do  
with them. I did not find these heaps interesting for their potential to depict waste material, 
but because they forcefully and unavoidably embodied it: they were made of unmediated, 
ungraspable, useless stuff... not objects, but things. 29>
     Accepting that it would be impossible to recreate the material experience of those 
heaps out of digital photographs, I decided to use the images to think about the material 
and the processes of digital reproduction that made this recreation so impossible. I printed 
out some of the images on a laser printer using a very coarse raster.  The raster of a laser 
printer is generated by the raster image processor (RIP), a chip that controls which areas of 
the photoreceptor/the imaging drum are charged by the laser; the toner powder sticks  
to those areas.  The image is produced by transferring the toner onto paper and fixing it 
with heat. I did not ›make‹ the image, it was processed; I made the choices on how it was 
processed. 
    I sought for a certain ambiguity and planned an experiment: Was it possible to use and 
layer digital and analogue printing materials and processes in such a way that they not just 
revealed an image but also themselves? Would it be possible to make an image that 
oscillated between its own thingness and that which this thingness represents — paper 
white snow, dirty toner grit? 30>
Would it be possible to reveal the traces of the image’s digital production?
I re-digitized the image by scanning it in with a very high resolution. I enlarged it and 
printed it out once more, tiled on A4 sheets. I transferred the toner of the laser prints onto 
a 1.5 × 2 m piece of linoleum using acetone. I then cut out the dots the laser printer 
delineated for me.  This took about one-and-a-half months, during which I somewhat 
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 30 Something like Christopher 
Wool’s untitled screen prints/
paintings, although less ab- 
stract: Wool reproduced and layered 
images of blobs and smudges of 
colors. Each print turns out very 
different, the raster dots be- 
come new blobs of colours, they 
merge and thus blur the distinction 
of print and painting. (L)
  
29 Something like 
Robert Smithson’s 
“Partially Buried Wood 
Shed”, but without 
the intentionality: In 
January 1970, Smithson, 
»along with a handful 
of students from the 
School of Art, rented 
a backhoe and piled 20 
cartloads of dirt on 
an abandoned woodshed 
until the center beam 
cracked.« (PBW) / (K) 
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ironically listened to an unabridged audio book of Marcel Proust’s In Search of Lost Time.  
I followed a plan. I did not make any artful decisions. I decided to become a part of the 
mechanism, to limit my expression in order to emphasize the process of the digital 
translations, to become as indifferent to the image as the RIP of the printer. It was a 
tedious undertaking.  The image was already there, it existed as a delineation, a digital 
pattern, and now just had to be made.
    I hand-printed the lino cut three times. I made two copies on paper, one on Tyvek, a 
fully synthetic material made from flashspun non-woven HDPE fibre, that — even though 
it could not be any further in substance from handmade paper — somehow has the 
look-and-feel of Japanese washi paper. Printing from the large lino stock by hand was an 
incredible experience: I was sweating all over, rubbing the thick paper onto the linoleum 
with a ball-bearing baren for hours, blistering my hands. It was amazing to see how a  
digital file could exhaust me in order to become a material image. My hands, my fingers —  
my digits — bore the traces of the experience of this translation.
    I feel that this experiment failed to a certain extent, but that this failure turned out to 
be very productive. I was slightly disappointed to find that the image had ›won‹.  Although 
I sent it through many layers of translation, it still represents and depicts — it turned out  
to be more resilient than I had anticipated.  The material of the image is highly apparent, but 
this materiality is nonetheless overruled by the image it becomes. 
    One of the most remarkable experiences was looking at the linoleum when I was 
finished with cutting.  Although I had spent so long lying on the floor in direct bodily con- 
tact with the stuff of representation, the image felt instantaneous: it was ›now‹. Just as the 
duration of a scan is not traceable in the resulting image, the time it took to cut this image 
became nothing like a claim: conceptualized and framed according to the idea of manual 
labour, or described as an endurance piece, it loses the actuality of the thing I hoped it might 
become.  As soon as the image existed, it became a 
recognizable abstraction. 31 ( -> APPENDIX B)
31 In an artist talk, Hans Peter 
Feldmann mentioned how he is 
fascinated by the vigour of kitschy 
pictures depicting clichés like 
sunsets, dolphins or couples on 
beaches. For his /Sonntagsbilder/ 
(1976/78) he tried to challenge 
them by crudely photocopying 
them in black and white. He said 
that he could not destroy these 
images, that the act of cognition 
would still recreate the colourful 
stereotypes.) (Feldmann 17:50) (M)
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2.3 ON INFORMATION
After having made this productive experience of being ultimately defeated by a (digital) 
image, I decided to further focus my attention toward the body of digital media itself. 
Materializing digital data means moving things from one formal structure to another.  
How to stress these formal structures themselves? Can I emphasize them as causes of a literal 
in-formation of a thing? Do they become evident when I use a medium to reflect itself — 
 when the body of the medium becomes itself media content that is subject to its own formal 
material? 
    Since I previously studied typography and book arts, I am particularly interested in the 
supposed immateriality of ebooks and PDFs, the supposed disembodiment of written 
information through digitalization, and the alleged self-identicality of the page in a book 
and the page in a digital document (cf. Gitelman 125ff): A PDF is supposed to »look the 
same on the screen and in print, regardless of what kind of computer or printer someone  
is using and regardless of what software package was originally used to create it« (USCB). 
The scanned image you may see 
right now is supposed to somehow 
have the same status as this printed 
book. How to question this argued 
identicality of form? 32
32 Indeed, many people are asking such questions. The P-DPA 
(Post-Digital Publishing Archive), initiated and run by 
Silvio Lorusso, has the aim to »systematically collect, 
organize and keep trace of experiences in the fields of art 
and design that explore the relationships between publishing 
and digital technology« (P-DPA). Many of the works listed 
show a growing weariness of the belief that to digitize 
things is to advance them. They are experiments that point 
less towards the idea of total digitalization of that which 
the book once was, and more towards embracing pluralities.  
To give just three examples: 
(N) Paul Chan published his short story »Holiday« through 
his publishing project ›Badlands Unlimited‹ both on a stone 
slab and as an ebook. 
(O) Charles Mazé’s and Coline Sunier’s /Digitized by Google/ 
is a stamp, a »[m]anual version of the digital watermark 
placed by Google on the lower right side of each page of a 
PDF document.« (P-DPA, /Digitized by Google/) 
(P) Silvio Lorusso’s and Sebastian Schmieg’s collaboration 
»56 Broken Kindle Screens« is a print on demand paperback 
that consists of found photos depicting broken Kindle 
screens. When the glass of the screen breaks, different 
pages, cover illustrations and interface elements are 
accidentally layered. The screen shows a strange, frozen 
›collage‹. The artists use these images to examine the 
materiality of the device. The work can also be downloaded 
as an ebook onto the Kindle to recreate the effect on the 
actual device. 
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THE INFORMATION I (on killing one’s darling and  
creating content) 
»In writing, you must kill all your darlings.« — William Faulkner 
A
I had a smallish hardcover book bound by a book binder after my 
specifications. It measures 112 mm × 182 mm, and contains 144 
empty pages, the cover and endpapers are light grey, the block is 
made from a thin recycling paper (90 g/sqm). I (digitally) filmed 
myself smashing the book for as long as I could (a little over 17 
minutes); I threw it on the floor and against the wall; I literally 
trajected it, I threw it across. I chose the setting and my clothes to 
match the decisive neutrality and the considered indifference of the 
appearance of the book, further stressing its emptiness. By smashing 
it, I in-formed the book; as Kirschenbaum put it: »every contact 
leaves a trace« (M 49). I attempted to stress the bookness of the 
book, to show it as the insisting and resisting thing it has to be  
in order to sustain its media function: a book is not a fluid object. 
For me, the word ›book‹ does not predominantly denote a 
malleable, liquid outpouring of abstract information but a potentially 
meaningful thing; like jugs, books exist as manifestations, as 
embodied gatherings. I did not ›kill‹ the book by smashing it. It 
remained a book after all, an artificial ruin of a book. 33 
I chose to smash an empty book to question the implications that 
digitalization has for the body of the book as a container, and how 
it shifts the idea of the book further towards being a metaphor for 
disembodied text (and thus memory itself).  The book, to use 
Drucker’s words, »represents a self-conscious record of its own 
production« (C 161).  ( -> APPENDIX C.1)
33  In 1966, John Latham 
invited his students to join 
him in chewing an edition 
of Clement Greenberg’s /Art 
And Culture/ to bits (/Still 
and Chew/). He fermented 
the resulting pulp into 
a transparent liquid and 
then tried to return it to 
the library of St Martin’s 
School of Art where he had 
borrowed it (Latham). Books 
play a central role in 
Latham’s work. He used (and 
abused) them as metaphorical 
containers of knowledge, 
in actions that can be 
understood as challenging 
acts of love. He proved 
that violence against the 
physical bodies of books 
cannot kill their ideas, 
that memory is not material 
but rather /lives/ in and 
over time; that all objects 
(thoughts as well as the 
things we encounter in the 
world) are /events/ that 
occur and reoccur (ibid.). 
Digital files do not offer 
shortcuts to the experience 
of John Latham’s metaphysical 
/events/ — on the contrary, 
the practical immateriality 
of the digital object makes 
it hard to subtract the 
concept from its substrate; 
it exists in structures that, 
no matter how invisible they 
have become, necessarily 
remain factual. How could I 
chew an ebook? Would Latham 
have smashed and burned ebook 
readers? Could the body of 
a computer have withstood 
his acts of love for 
existence in a similar way?
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BI scanned in the entire damaged book, turning its emphasized three-dimensionality into 
flat digital images which represent the traces of this act of in-formation. I created content 
by turning the ruin into a digital object. I printed these images onto the same materials 
using a black-and-white laser printer and then hand-bound them back into four new 
books, matching the measurements of the original book.  The pages themselves became 
significant.  They are no longer empty, they show a translated reflection of the emptiness of 
the respective page in the original book. I would like to suggest that this process of (partly 
digital) reproduction turned the act of smashing the book into an act of drawing.
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CParallel to the recreation of the book as a reflexive and manifest 
document of its damaged body, I also turned the scanned images 
into an ebook, an embodied metaphor of a book. I asked a 
photographer to take pictures of this ›digital book‹ while I ›flipped‹ 
through it. (Again, I tried to keep the setting for the photographs 
decisively indifferent.) 34
    The light that passed through the pixels of the screen hit the 
digital camera and were recorded as yet another digital object, as 
the iPad showed the skeuomorphic animation of the ›flipping‹ of a 
page that has no third dimension. 35
Can a thing ever be two-dimensional?
I chose to present this image as a commercial offset lithograph. I 
ordered it online. It measures B3. Like the almost empty print, and 
indeed like all the other works, it moved through a mechanism that 
has now become invisible. 
 I decided to fold the paper into eight equal sections (B5) to stress 
its presence as a three-dimensional thing.  The folds function like 
formalized crumples, they orderly disrupt the flatness of the image 
that shows and frames the flatness of the screen in it.  There is some 
thing there because other things that are not present have been 
there — this thing here is a gathering. 
    I cut out a QR (›quick response‹) code at the lower bottom 
corner of the poster. I physically removed squares that suitable de- 
vices may read as pixels. It encodes a link that can be used to  
retrieve a copy of the EPUB file represented in the image from a 
server. For Gitelman, QR codes are »an end imagined within the 
repertoire of the so-called posthuman. [...] Not quite text (from  
a reader’s standpoint) and not entirely image (at the scanner)« (135); 
without a working interface to decode it, this code is just an ab- 
stract, even slightly absurd ornament, that could, however, be re- 
garded as an analogy of how the image visible on the screen is also 
made up of pixels. 36 
34 The inclusion of full-
sized images is still not 
easy to do in EPUBs as 
they are mainly meant as 
containers for reflowable 
text; the text is ›raw‹ and 
different interfaces render 
it legible in different 
ways (Kanai). I created a 
›fixed format‹ EPUB, which 
is very much comparable to 
a PDF-file; the pages in 
such a document are images 
representing themselves, 
thought of as self-identical 
(cf. Gitelman 118f). 
35 Apple patented the 
virtual page flip in 2012, 
yet the patent does not 
refer to paper at all, it 
protects the idea of an 
»animated graphical user 
interface« (Cranfill).
36  I also played with this 
idea when I translated the 
German text of Benjamin’s 
essay »The Work of Art 
in the Age of Mechanical 
Reproduction« from ASCII into 
binary code, into a string 
of zeros and ones. Since a 
string is notoriously hard 
to depict, I decided to turn 
it into a two-dimensional 
bitmap. I added line breaks 
to let it flow into the 
proportions of the standard 
paper size. The resulting 
image is more like noise 
than information. In this 
form, the essay cannot be 
easily accessed by humans 
or computers. The meaning 
of the text is lost in 
(digital) translation, it is 
stuck in a limbo of formal 
material. I include a printed 
version of this bitmap in 
the appendix  — > APPENDIX D.2
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EExhibiting the damaged book and its reproduction proved difficult; after trying to show 
the work on a table and on a shelf ( -> APPENDIX C.3), I chose to hang them on the  
wall behind A4 glass panes as if they were images.  The books are framed and held in place  
because the panes are solid things. Each supported by four nails, they press the books 
slightly against the wall.  The transparency of the glass reveals the object behind it. Like  
a window, it shows the damaged book as it lay on the glass of the scanner.  There is a third 
glass pane, but it is empty; below this frame, on the floor, as if it fell down, is an iPad  
that plays the video that shows how I smashed the book.  The glass of its screen is cracked. 
All things are subject to gravity. 
Can a book be an image? 
/
While I was working on shifting the body of the book back and forth between being a di- 
gital object and a three-dimensional thing, I became increasingly interested in the glass  
of the scanner. I started to think of it as a liminal space where things are turned into digital 
objects.  The most interesting aspect for me was how the act of scanning happens in time:  
a steady movement of a line of light produces reflections that are registered by a photo- 
sensor which translates them into a string of code. Unlike a camera, scanners are not dark 
rooms in which external light is trapped; as Chantal Faust notes, a »scanning device comes 
equipped with its own in-built light source: its ›sun‹ is artificial and illuminates upon each 
scan.« (2) 37>
    Is this time of the scan the time it takes to ›solute‹ the thing into a self-identical pattern? 
Scanning is a comprehensible act of digitalization compared to the instantaneousness of 
capturing images using digital cameras. I used scanners ›naturally‹ in many works but never 
focused my attention on the scanner itself; as with the reproduced smashed book, the 
scanner always remained invisible in the finished work. In scanning, there is cause and 
effect: I can watch the light move. I hear the sound of the motor.  And then there is  
the image on the screen.  A scan is the process of the coming into being of the image — in 
Heideggerian terms: it is an Ereignis — a happening.  At the same time, a scan promises an 
objective image: choosing the same settings results in equal movements.  The light is always 
equally bright. Scanning an image several times apparently produces the ›same‹ digital  
object. How and why — the processes in between the action of the scanner and its effect — 
 remains black box magic.  To show the scanner’s ›performance‹ of digitalization, and to 
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investigate the time and physical space it suggests, I made various smaller exercises, which 
did not make it into my final selection of works but which I enclose in the appendix. I 
scanned mirrors and used digital cameras to film and photograph the scanner while it was 
scanning.  -> APPENDIX D  
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 Luigi Amato’s /Untitled #1/ is a digital 
photograph of an opened flatbed scanner 
whose glass plate is completely covered by 
mirrors; a gesture that perfectly questions 
the scanner’s ›pane‹ of vision. (R)
  
38 The design and publishing collaborative Dexter Sinister 
(David Reinfurt and Stuart Bailey) beautifully captured time 
hidden in the scanned image when they scanned an analogue 
watch. The hand indicating the seconds is bent. (S)
  
37 Mike Golembewski (a 2004 RCA interaction 
design alumnus) used flatbed scanners as 
cameras. He removed the light, enclosed 
them and shone outside light on the sensor 
through a system of lenses, creating a »new 
tool for examining the relationships between 
time, motion, and image« (Golembewski) (Q).
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[TECHNIQUES OF THE OBSERVER (amazing gaze)
A
To concentrate on the scanner itself (as a thing) and its relationship to the image it produces, 
I laid two scanners on top of each other.  Turned about 90 degrees, the glass of the one 
scanner faced the glass of the other. I then made the scanners scan each other.  They each 
captured the case of the other device and the enclosed movable image processing unit under 
the glass.  The glass remains invisible. Since both scanners caught the movement of the light 
of the other scanner in time, the image shows an inclined white line where the scrutinizing 
lights of the scanners met. However, the duration of the scan is not readily apparent.  The lag 
is lost, the image appears instantaneous; the lines have become a pane. < 38
   The title refers to Crary’s book Techniques of the Observer. Examining how perception is his- 
torically constructed, Crary suggests that vision is subject to changing conceptions, to  
»plural forces and rules composing the field in which perception occurs«.  The observer —  
the subject — is »embedded in a system of conventions and limitations« (6). (There is a formal 
material of vision.) Crary argues that the overtly visible changes in the modes of depiction 
and the processes of image-making, the radical »ruptures« in the avant-garde art movements 
of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, even the development of photography, 
are rooted in earlier changed conceptions about the observer. 39
    This process turned the observer from a passive witness of an objective and stable truth 
outside of him or her — Crary uses the camera obscura as a model to describe this 
idea — into an emancipated agent who actively constructs objects out of sensory data. Vi- 
sion becomes subjective; truth something made through a process of synthesis.  The  
key to an objective description of the things in the world was therefore no longer thought 
to be found in the things themselves (they had been rendered inaccessible), but rather in 
the cognition of objects, in the observer’s conceptional potential. Hence, the search for truth 
was turned inwards, towards the physiology of perception, the tech- 
niques of the observer. In turn, human vision became itself an 
object of inquiry, something »measurable and thus exchangeable« 
(17). In other words:  Vision left the body and objectivity was 
outsourced as the subject was considered to be too involved in the 
process of objectivation to be trusted. 
     The progression of digital technology can be understood as a con- 
sequential development of this idea of objectivity. Some people 
hope it promises the capability of thought unfettered from human 
subjectivity, an outsourcing not just of vision, but also of thinking.   
39 Crary: »Very generally, 
what happens to the obser- 
ver in the nineteenth 
century is a process of 
modernization; he  
or she is made adequate 
to a constellation of 
new events, forces, and 
institutions that together 
are loosely and perhaps 
tautologically definable 
as ›modernity.‹« (9)
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    Which one of the two scanners is the observer? 
B
To foreground the scanner’s act of ›cutting‹ up the reflection of things, of rasterizing them 
to make them into digital images, I enlarged one of the images and printed it tiled on  
6 × 4 A4 sheets of paper. I once more used a black-and-white laser printer.  The paper is the 
same I used to make the books.  The non-printed edges of sheets, the empty unprinted 
space in the bottom row and the curvature of the paper all interfere with the diagonal line 
of the scanner, making it apparent that here light is represented by paper. 
( -> APPENDIX E.1)
C
To capture the duration of the scan that is lost in the image (and to reflect what real-time 
means when one is confronted with digital objects), I filmed the two scanners as they 
scanned each other using my laptop’s camera.  At the same time, I placed another camera 
on top of the scanners and filmed the display connected to my laptop that showed the  
›live image‹ of how my laptop camera recorded the two scanners scanning each other. In a 
next step, I repeated this but additionally played this recorded film on the screen.  The 
sound of the scanners is layered with the recorded sound of the scanners, the noise of the 
fan of the computer, and my occasional clicks on its trackpad. ( -> APPENDIX E.2)
    Whereas the image of the scan does not reveal that it was composed in time, it is hard 
to tell what process one is actually watching in the film; there is a lot going on, but 
nothing really makes sense or explains anything.  The film is an indifferent and intricate, 
flat and empty layering of digital devices that reflect each other and their own existence in 
space and time. 40
    This space and time is turned into a digital object: I could write down the file it became 
as a series of zeros and ones; as a digital inscription it is comparable to a text in a book —  
the whole story of data is there at once — but human experience cannot access it this  
way; it must be translated back.  All effects that the camera captured, whether the effect of 
other digital objects (the files on my desktop and some text is also visible in the ›back- 
ground‹ of the screen) or other ›real‹ things (the edge of the laptop filming the scanners,  
a plant, and the sunlight shining through the window) have been equalized as image  
and sound information. Helen Marten compares the effects of such seemingly immaterial 
layering to an inlay. She argues that it cannot have the materiality of a collage because 
»substance is not really substance when we observe it through the screen« (Marten 6). 
After the scanners were done scanning, I turned the laptop in my direction and stopped 
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the recorded film and my recording.  The large lino-cut shortly becomes visible in the back- 
ground, filmed as a digital reflection, a record of a live stream. I press the virtual play 
button and what was captured as a live stream in real-time in the beginning, starts to play 
as a record. (A flattened hall of mirrors.)
171

THE INFORMATION II (handsfree)
Then it hit me: 
The glass of the scanner is not the actual pane of digitalization, it functions like a window: 
its firm thingness holds the object at a distance, its transparency lets the scrutinizing light 
of the image processing unit and its reflections pass. 
A
I smashed the glass of a scanner with its lid open using a hammer as it was scanning the 
dark room. I broke its window. 40
    I turned this scan into an A3-sized digital print covered with a glossy varnish. I folded it 
horizontally to emphasize two ›moments in time‹ — the first line indicates the moment 
when the hammer smashed the glass, the second shows how the shards blocked the 
movement of the sensor, resulting in the vertical lines in the bottom section of the image. 
40 After I did this, I was startled to see how Latham’s 
work is not only full of abused books, but that he also 
frequently used shattered glass to emphasize the bodiliness 
of transparence; its being there, but being partly 
invisible. His late work /God is Great #4/, which caused 
much controversy [cf. Smith]), consists of a Bible, a 
Talmud and a Koran laying on a field of shattered glass 
(»God is Great (10-19)«). Once again, Latham concentrated  
on the metaphorical quality of things, on their quality  
as /events/, rupturing things to point at their immanent 
fluidity in time. But again he was much more interested in 
media as carriers of ideas, as embodied time. (Empty books 
would not have caused that much controversy.)
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BAfter removing the glass and the top of the case, I put an empty sheet of recycling paper 
(the same as I used in the books) into the scanner. I let it scan this sheet for as long as  
it was possible without having to interfere. It recorded 25 images ( -> APPENDIX F.1).  As 
the sheet was no longer held at a distance, the moving image processing unit crumpled  
the paper while it recorded an image. It physically in-formed the sheet while its sensors 
processed the light they caught as digital image information. Both things physically 
resisted each other. I printed the 25 images using a laser printer in the slightly smaller B5 
format. (A digital file has no fixed format. It can be effortlessly made to appear smaller or 
larger.)
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CI filmed the process with a digital camera to document the movement of the light in time. 
(The light of the scanner was caught by the image sensor of the camera.) The video  
is 13min20sec long; it is shown on an repurposed raw LCD screen.  The paper size of the 
sheet on the screen matches the scaled paper of the prints.  The naked controller-board,  
the Raspberry-Pi mini computer that loops the digital video file, and two small bare 
speakers are dangling down from it. It is a slightly messy conglomerate, a thing made of 
things. ( -> APPENDIX E.2)
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DThe crumpled and torn sheet directly relates to the crumpled page introduced at the be- 
ginning of this thesis. It is a physical record of the performance of the scanner. It resisted 
and insisted. It is now a ruin, but is still instantly recognizable as a sheet of A4. Whereas I 
re-presented the paper in the introduction by manually crumpling it, I crumpled this sheet 
by proxy, by means of clicking a few digital buttons that started the relentless mechanism 
of the naked image processing unit. ( -> APPENDIX E.3)
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2.4 ON THE BODY OF DIGITAL INTERFACES 
After looking at the scanner as a performing interface-thing, my interest shifted away from 
the structure that sustained its ›interface effect‹ (Galloway) and even further towards  
the thing sustaining this effect. I now became fully aware that this was what I had been in- 
terested in all along: the physical thing that vanishes from perception as it functions as  
a medium; the becoming invisible of the body of information as this information is accessed. 
    The last two speculative objects I made attempt to focus solely on this fragile body —  
they do not sustain digital objects or deal with the act of translation anymore, but are re- 
flections on the emptiness of digital interfaces that my argument of the contingency  
of their effects relies upon.  After all, there is still this unique thing that I can tamper with,  
this strange body that is thrown into the world, subject to entropy, that exists and thus  
resists any other thing — despite the language that escapes it, the frameworks that surround 
it, the Gestell.
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41 I later came across Yung-
Hsing Wu’s article »Kindling, 
Disappearing, Reading«. Wu 
brilliantly unpacks these 
complications by drawing 
connections between the 
name and ideas of Ray 
Bradbury’s /Fahrenheit 451/. 
42  Conran said in an 
interview, that Jeff Bezos 
(Amazon’s CEO) asked him 
for a name that could be 
used »to talk about the 
future of reading, but in a 
small, not braggadocio way. 
We didn’t want it to be 
›techie‹ or trite, and we 
wanted it to be memorable, 
and meaningful in many ways 
of expression« (cf. Heller).
LITERALLY (TO KINDLE KINDLE) 
    When Amazon named their reading device ›Kindle‹, it struck me that not more people 
associated this name with its literal meaning: »to set something on fire«. 41
    Amazon’s marketing guidelines even ask to refrain from »Fire/flames and similar graphics« 
and »Plays on the word ›fire‹ « when advertising their ›Fire‹ products (Amazon). When 
Michael Conran came up with the name in 2005, he wanted to point to the transcendental 
qualities of the written word — but in a friendly and everyday way. 42 
    Yet I cannot help but think about the many horrible actual book burnings that so force- 
fully intended to kill the ideas that books embody (graphesis) by kindling the body sus-
taining it.  The naming of the device points at the immateriality of the thoughts that a book 
contains, the idea of language as a bodiless force that lights up minds. It is a metaphysical 
promise. Unlike the notion of clouds or windows, the name »Kindle« turns a verb into a 
noun (»The word »Kindle« should not be used as a verb« [ibid.]). Just as Heidegger 
attempted to grasp the hidden forces that gather what comes into 
being using collective nouns (the Gestell and the Geschenk), the name 
›Kindle‹ linguistically removes the gap between »that which has (yet) 
to be kindled« and »that which has (already) been kindled« — the de- 
vice itself is claimed to embody the experience of reading. 
Potentiality is argued to have become actuality. 
    To question this metaphor that suggests an immaterial flame of 
knowledge (mathesis), I read the name as an order: I (digitally) filmed 
myself setting a Kindle on fire. It was extremely important for me 
that this did not come across as a gross act of violence against the 
device or an attempt to criticise digitalization in general, but rather as 
an absurd and indifferent exercise without much consequence.  After 
all, ›to kindle‹ is not the same as ›to burn‹; kindling the Kindle did 
not destroy it. It still works. 43 
    I completely deleted all data from the device — the screen is blank. 
I tried to show it as the thing it is.  As I am focussing on the re- 
lationship between this depicted thing and language (its name),  
I decided to use the medium of (digital) film linguistically too: the 
first minute of the film shows me holding the device — the image 
seems to be a still. 
Cut.
43  This project once more 
resonates with Latham’s 
practice. But again, the 
emptying out the digital 
container of content 
changes the significance 
of the act, stressing the 
container, not the containe
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Everything stays the same, except that the device is suddenly on fire. (The cut ›kindles‹ it; 
just like the flip of the page in this thesis just has.) My hand remains completely still as  
the flames flicker softly and lambently at the top of the device. (Does it really burn? Or 
 is this a digital animation? The light of the flame has become a digital effect, animated by 
the light that shines through pixels of the screen.) 
Cut. 
After a minute the video loops, the cut magically ›repairs‹ the device, it is ›unkindled‹, the 
slight damage is gone, as if nothing has happened… until it is ›rekindled‹ again. I display 
the film on a mini-tablet of Amazon’s »Fire« series.  Another cheap pun. ( -> APPENDIX H)
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HOMAGE TO DIETER ROTH (such stuffing / as dreams are made 
on) 44
Between 1961 and 1974, Dieter Roth created various Literaturwuerste (›Literature Sausages‹). 
He took magazines, newspapers, and books by authors that he did not like or of whom  
he was jealous, minced them, mixed them with herbs and other ingredients according to 
traditional sausage recipes, and stuffed this mix into sausage casings.  The grand finale was 
20 sausages produced from the 20 volumes of the complete works of Georg Wil- 
helm Friedrich Hegel by the collector Hanns Sohm in 1974 following Roth’s instructions 
(Dobke 74).  This mischievous act breaks down the idea of the 
sublime, transcendental power of the word to expose how it 
depends on printed matter, on humble, bodily stuff. 45
    I bought a damaged first generation iPad (which has now, eight 
years after it was introduced, become obsolete and thus inexpen- 
sive). I had it ground at a waste management facility and then made 
a sausage following one of Roth’s recipes:
   1 iPad 
   1 clove of garlic
   1/2 onion
   3 tbsp salt
   1 tbsp freshly ground pepper
   1 tsp paprika
   1 tsp fennel seeds
   1 tbsp chili flakes
   1/2 tsp crushed bay leaves
   1/4 tsp thyme
   some coriander
   1/2 cup red wine
   mixed and stuffed into a transparent sausage casing.
This (rather toxic [cf. EC]) sausage is a very different object to a 
Literaturwurst: There was no content on the iPad — I wiped the data 
on it thoroughly before I had it ground. What was ground were  
the inscriptions of first and second order that are not recognizable 
44  Prospero: Our revels  
now are ended. These our 
actors, / As I foretold you, 
were all spirits, and / Are 
melted into air, into thin 
air: / And like the baseless 
fabric of this vision, / The 
cloud-capp’d tow’rs, the gor- 
geous palaces, / The solemn 
temples, the great globe 
itself, / Yea, all which it 
inherit, shall dissolve, / 
And, like this insubstantial 
pageant faded, / Leave not a 
rack behind. We are such 
stuff / As dreams are made 
on; and our little life / Is 
rounded with a sleep. 
William Shakespeare | The 
Tempest Act 4, scene 1, 
148–158
45  Roth challenged the idea 
of /typification/ through 
sheer abundance. He blurred 
the lines between art and 
life by turning almost 
everything into an object of 
potential interest. For /
Flacher Abfall/ (1975–76), 
he collected almost every 
piece of flat waste he 
came across over the course 
of one year; he put every 
piece in a transparent 
film and filed it. There 
are receipts, notes, and 
banana peels…(Dobke 160)
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for humans and are now probably not even reconstructable using computer forensics. It is 
a different kind of useless ruin, a ruin of possibilities. It is a broken vessel, no longer a  
window. It shows the shattered bodily stuff that promises digital contingency. (Interestingly, 
if I was to make a sausage of the newest iPad, it would be less than half as big.) When I 
hold it in my hands, grasping the weight of the stuff that formerly sustained and con- 
jured up digital objects, there is nothing meaningful there that could make it disappear. I 
am stuck with its bodily presence. It is boring, underwhelming.  A (post-post-digital) joke.
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CONCLUSION
This is where my encircling of the computer ends.  This project was driven and sustained 
by my cognitive inability to bridge the gap between the existence of the physical object  
of the computer, and the meaningful objects its interfaces reveal. In the end, it does not 
matter if I choose to break the computer and its black box and make it stop working, or if 
I decide to step back from it to examine the effects its interfaces produce: the existential 
rift between self and thing remains. In the course of this thesis, I have tried to evoke  
this rift through a constellation of things and ideas, to make this gap evident through the 
space of association. I reflected on the state of my own post-digital entanglement in things; 
things that disappear as they become informational and reappear as this informational  
state is halted.  These transitional moments when black mirrors become digital windows, 
then black mirrors again, influence not only my thinking and my artistic practice, but my 
daily life.  The three texts included at the end of the appendices are yet another attempt  
to grasp this entanglement, each dealing with a particular quotidian encounter with digital 
objects.( -> APPENDIX H) 
    As I watched myself and contemplated this entanglement — shifting my focus away from 
the sustained object towards the unfathomable body of digital media — through my 
writing and the development of my practical work, I increasingly realized that the com- 
puter is not at all a compliant, transparent and passive tool. The computer became apparent 
as a thing that, despite being »programmed«, acts on its own: an actant, a thing that I not 
only work with but also very often work for to make it do what I want it to do. (For ex- 
ample, in order to loop a video on a raw video screen, I had to order controllers from  
a supplier in China; we communicated using Google Translate, through silicon and fibre 
optic cables. I also needed to learn to operate Linux command lines. Each of these pro- 
cesses became insignificant and invisible once everything functioned as planned.) I turned 
my growing awareness of this device paradigm into a process of questioning, which eventu- 
ally led to each single element of this thesis. I was not looking for ways to open the  
black box in order to unpack its hidden truth, or a Heideggerian essence of the digital 
machine. I sought for a vocabulary, a means to point at the abyss between language,  
digital things, and the objects they sustain.  Through my practice, I aim to create a reflective 
setting that lets those digital things become evident outside of language. 
    I identified and described the computer as a writing tool that stems from and reflects 
the language and thus the culture that surrounds it; it is a pre-inscribed sampling machine 
embedded in what Kittler called a »discourse network« (or, more literally translated, an 
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»inscription system«). If Kittler was right when he argued that »media determine our situa- 
tion« (G xxxix), then the computer cannot be regarded as objective, neutral or empty.  
It necessarily has been shaped by conceptions and ideologies, which always in one way  
or another inform its effects. Kittler understood media as manifestations of power structures 
that impose rules and limitations on our understanding.  As all media formalize and typify, 
they necessarily condition how we think. (»Our writing tools are also working on our 
thoughts«, he quoted Nietzsche [G 200].) Thus, for Kittler, humans have become ›cases‹ that 
are ›dealt with‹ through media; the only thing we can do, he suggests, is to »take stock of  
the situation« (xli ff) by trying to grasp the formal material of media (which he does not name 
this way). 
    The quantification of everything through digitalization, the unsettling realities of mass 
surveillance, as well as both the deliberate and unintentional creation of ›big data‹ and its 
management to predict behaviour (cf. Morosov ch. 6), could be regarded as indicators for 
how humans are in fact increasingly becoming informational cases, dealt with through 
(digital) media in Kittler’s sense. 
    Through my practice, I take stock by stepping back from those larger issues, to reflect on 
individual empty interfaces, the shells and surfaces of contemporary digital devices that 
frame this formal material. I purposely have not, however, tried to explain how they work as 
machines (as others have done brilliantly already [cf. criticalengineering.com,  Kirschen- 
baum]). I rather aimed to investigate how the thingly existence of the computer and its 
interfaces are put to work to deny their very bodily existence; I have aimed to embrace the 
necessary sensuousness of the encounter with digital machines. 
    As I have discussed, from a post-humanist perspective, digital interfaces are often no 
longer regarded as physical means, embodying the workings of the machine so that they 
become accessible to sentience.  They are rather understood as a bothersome gap, a noise, a 
friction that needs to be overcome.  As my practical work developed, I found myself 
revisiting a post-conceptual sensibility towards this underwhelming, unresolvable thingly 
residue that stubbornly resists typification: I let my point of view oscillate between a more 
objective attempt to comprehend the computer theoretically, as the embodiment of an ab- 
stract mathematical model, and a highly subjective approach toward the phenomenological 
realities of its material existence. In an iterative process, I have moved back and forth 
between trying to understand the computer as a thing, from a contemplative distance, and 
attempting to find ways to experience its unintuitive material as sensually and as close to  
my body as possible. From questioning the substrate of digital images, and the problems of 
the translations of things into and out of digital data, this shifting of perspective has led me 
to facing, tinkering with and tampering with the digital interface as a thing itself.
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I have observed that there is hardly any noticeable friction in the working of contemporary 
computers anymore that could be productively exploited; there is almost no indication  
of the working of the formal material of the machine.  This is mainly due to the dependable 
seamlessness of twenty-first-century media (Hansen), which have quickly yet radically 
changed how people position themselves, how they connect with each other and with 
the things around them.  The very condition of objects has changed tremendously — a 
book is now no longer necessarily considered to be a bodily container, it can now also be 
a series of digital images or a digital text (cf.  The Information I, the PDF of this thesis). 
However, as I encountered in practice, the more convincing and readily available digital 
objects become, the greater the rupture when the machine stops working, and the more 
apparent the formal material in poorer quality digital representations turns out to be.  The 
Kantian Gegenstand is not lost at all, objects still require the active human act of 
recognition to be turned from effects into something meaningful. 
    Accepting the impossibility of accessing the black box of the computer using my senses, 
I turned instead to observe myself, as I — through my practice — repeatedly asked what 
this inability means for the status of my subjectivity. I found the stubbornness of things to 
be reliable and rich.  And even though their aloof and silent absurdity cannot answer this 
pressing question regarding the contemporary digital human condition, my grappling 
with them leaves me with aesthetic experiences and tacit knowledge that now, at the end 
of my research project, enables me to keep asking this question more effectively. 
Through my practical and theoretical encircling of the computer, I hope to have highlighted 
how things ultimately cannot be virtual, how the digital objects produced through the 
operating embodiment of a Turing machine — as all virtual realities — always require a  
thingly infrastructure sustaining them, and how this infrastructure necessarily needs  
to be forgotten in order for these sustained virtual objects to become real through recog- 
nition. I am not arguing that virtual objects are not ›as real‹ as the things that sustain them; 
I am rather trying to emphatically demonstrate what Drucker describes as graphesis: to 
show how the virtual can only exist through a functional relationship between the ideal  
and the material 47 — virtual objects never simply exist by themselves. I completely agree 
with Rob Shields’ suggestion that the point is »not to debate the 
reality of the virtual, but to develop a more sophisticated theory of 
the real and the ways in which the virtual and the concrete are 
different really existing forms, how they are related to each other 
and to non-existing abstractions and probabilities.« (21) By emphasi- 
zing the underwhelming reality of the computer as a thing, I aimed 
47  (virtual stems from the 
Latin word /virtus/ meaning 
strength or power — the 
virtuous describes the 
better, the more righteous 
and superior [»virtual«])
197
blank
198
to also emphasize the beauty of the experience of a frustrated synthesis: the very human 
struggle to maneuver and adapt to various levels of abstraction in a world full of things 
that are instantly recognized as objects pointing away from themselves, towards a fra- 
gile virtual world which disappears as instantaneously, when the pointing thing — for 
whatever reason — fails to keep pointing. 
    There are many reasons for the existence of empty books.  An empty e-book, however, 
seems to be without any purpose.  The page I see when I open my word processing 
software is not a substrate but a surface effect. I still wish I could reach out to this white 
rectangle made of light and crumple it; I believe this would be an instantaneous way  
to wordlessly bridge that gap I can only constantly encircle, a making physical of the 
virtual.  An admittance of the sensuousness of the digital page, and of all digital objects as 
they are created and sustained over time through the operation of the computer. 
    The paper page has been gathered, too — trees have been cut, made into pulp…  — but 
it does not need to be sustained: it is manifest. I can handle its physical presence. Digital 
objects are translations of patterns made of physical things that I can neither apprehend 
phenomenologically nor retrace conceptually: they remain forever distant. We face digital 
objects as effects without a traceable cause. But just as »No Thought Exists Without a 
Sustaining Support«, neither does the digital object. 
    There is some thing here.  
    The idea of the posthuman, as Hayles describes it, could also be understood as a resolu- 
tion of existence: the belief that since consciousness is nothing but an informational ›epi- 
phenomenon‹ (13), it can be digitized and potentially even enhanced by outsourcing it. If 
consciousness could indeed be broken down into its smallest parts, which form an im- 
material and abstract pattern that can be read and rewritten, existence would boil down to 
a (probably very long) chain of zeros and ones. However, the word resolution, as I would 
like to read it, also implies the notion of ›being resolute‹ — of standing firmly, of being aware 
and determined. 
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0  
INTRODUCTION. A PRELIMINARY NOTE AND  
A PRACTICAL DEMONSTRATION ON THE THING YOU SEE 
HERE / OR: ON THE THING BETWEEN YOU AND ME  
This text was PRINTED on paper using a dot matrix printer.  The printer received the ›raw‹ 
txt-file encoding the text as a string of letters, signs and spaces using 7-bit ASCII 
(American Standard Code for Information Interchange). A bit is a yes or a no, a zero or  
a one, an impulse or silence, a raised or resting arm, heads or tails... It does not matter what 
thing a bit is, what matters is its potential to clearly embody a discernible difference, a 
clearly distinguishable state. Every thing can be a bit. Seven bits can be combined in 128 
different ways.  These combinations are used in 7-bit ASCII to encode 33 non-printable 
control characters (Fischer 12-16) — such as 
   Start of Header, 
   Bell, 
   Line Feed, or 
   Cancel 
and 95 printable characters: 
   !«#$%&’()*+.-./
   0123456789
   :;<=>@
   ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVXYZ
   [\]^_`
   abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz
   {|}~ 
   space 
The txt-file is 149 075 bytes ›heavy‹, translated into binary code it contains 471 327 ›zeros‹  
and 538 636 ›ones‹.  The printer decoded this information and composed each character 
by printing small dots in a 9×9 matrix.  They are easily discernible. It turned 1001 011 into  
K , 1110 011 into  s ,  and 1011101 into  ] .   Again, these dots can be understood as bits,  
as ›ones‹ (printed dot) or ›zeros‹ (no dot).  Although a 9x9 grid offers 
2 417 851 639 229 258 349 412 352 possible combinations of printed and unprinted dots, 
not many of these combinations can be recognized as characters that convey meaning. 
There are only a few different fonts preset on the printer.  They link each ASCII character 
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with one particular combination of printed and unprinted dots and thus define that 1001 
011 looks like this particular   K   . 
    The PDF you may see now was written using black and white scans of these dots printed 
on paper: an immensely complex digitalization of this invisible string of bits that I write 
by hitting the keys of my laptop, another, much longer invisible string of bits, an image of 
a translation. 
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This text was printed on PAPER.  The paper remains evident and manifest. (Unless you are 
 reading this text in digital form, then it is only evident, as manifest derives from Latin, manus 
= ›hand‹ (›manifest‹), whereas evident stems from Latin videre = ›to see‹ [›evident‹]). 
However, if you read the text printed on paper, the paper may seem to become invisible, 
to lose its evidence while you read:
Where is the book I held in my hands? It is still there, and at the same time it is there no longer, it 
is nowhere.  That wholly object, that thing made of paper, as there are things made of metal or 
porcelain, that object is no more, or at least it is as if it no longer existed, as long as I read the book. 
For the book is no longer a material reality. It has become a series of words, of images, of ideas 
which in their turn begin to exist.  And where is this new existence? Surely not in the paper object. 
Nor, surely, in external space.  There is only one place left for this new existence: my innermost self. 
(Poulet 4) 1 
As you see here, if I take any text written or printed on paper, crumple it up and then  
flatten it out again, it is much more unlikely for the paper to become invisible in this way,  
to be actively filtered out, or repressed, the way George Poulet described.  The text is  
still here, its abstract content unchanged, but the slight damage increases and thus brings  
to attention what can be described as the background noise of the material support of the  
writing, its thingness made explicit and palpable, manifest. 
    In Thing Theory, Bill Brown explains that we are seldom confronted with this thingness  
of things, as »we look through objects […], because there are codes by which our inter- 
pretive attention makes them meaningful, because there is a discourse of objectivity  
that allows us to use them as facts« (5). He describes the realization of the thingness  
of things as a rupture: we experience their underlying thingness when objects suddenly no 
longer comply according to these codes, when they disappoint the expectations we have 
in them:
We begin to confront the thingness of objects when they stop working for us: when the drill 
breaks, when the car stalls, when the windows get filthy, 
  [when my computer does not boot up, 
   when the battery of my smartphone is empty and I am 
       relying on it to find a place I have never  
       been to before,
   when my screen cracks,
   when I cannot show my slides because the adapter 
       for the projector is missing, 
   …]
1 Bonnie Mak likewise notes 
that »despite its central 
role in the transmission 
of thought, the page often 
passes without registration 
or remark. So habituated 
to its operation, we often 
overlook how the page sets 
the parameters for our 
engagement with ideas« (9).
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when their flow within the circuits of production and distribution, consumption and exhibition, 
has been arrested, however momentarily. (Brown 4)
But the crumpled paper here is less a rupture than a noise.  Although the crumples obstruct 
the process of objectification, they do not arrest or silence it.  The crumpled paper does  
not resist objectification (the text has not become completely unintelligible), rather it insists 
on its own significance in the process of objectification; here: of playing its part in how 
printed dots are disregarded individually in order to become meaningful constellations, 
signifiers pointing at something beyond themselves: a text. (The crumpled paper plays along, 
making the text it sustains less stable and sound.) The insistence of things produces friction. 
Things insisting on their thingness demand an increased level of attention, putting to the 
test the automated and unconscious mechanisms of our reading them. Karl Schawelka 
refers to this as »frustrated synthesis«: the cognitive process of turning sensory informa- 
tion into meaningful objects is impeded, the mind has to work harder to grasp what reality 
is confronting it with (26).
    A thing is both more and less than an object.  As Brown notes, things »hover over the 
threshold between the nameable and unnameable, the figurable and the unfigurable, the 
identifiable, and the unidentifiable« (Brown 5).
    ›Object‹ can be translated as Objekt and Gegenstand into German. (Both words are often 
used as synonyms (HD). Gegenstand literally means »that which stands against«, »that  
which opposes something« (ibid.).  Thus Gegenstand indicates a relationship: some thing 
opposes (the subject). It is never just by itself. It exists as an opposition.  The word ›ob- 
ject‹ has a slightly different meaning. It derives from the Latin word objectum.  The prefix 
ob-, translates as »in the way«, iacere is ›to throw‹; the object is »that which is thrown in  
my way« (›object‹).  An object is actively moving, it is a projectile, its movement causes an 
effect.  To object is to actively oppose someone or something, to become a Gegenstand in 
order to stand against someone or something. While the object is thrown at me and I  
have no choice but to deal with it, the Gegenstand is static and calm (although not passive) 
in its resistance. It does not move, it stands. Immanuel Kant subtly differentiated between 
Objekt and Gegenstand: A Gegenstand exists as an experience, as a product of sensory data.  
It is not (yet) necessarily cognized by the understanding.  An Objekt exists because it has 
been recognized by the understanding. It is the synthesized Gegenstand (McWherter 157). 
Looked at this way, a Gegenstand could be regarded as being in between things (the 
thing-in-itself cannot be known, it lays outside of cognition) and objects (Eisler »Objekt«). 
For Kant, a Gegenstand is that which is experienced but which is not (yet) meaningful; it is 
being grasped while it withstands. It can only be grasped because it withstands.  The with- 
standing of the Gegenstand, that which stands against the subject in the process of cognition, is 
211
blank
212
its unknowable, unprocessable thingness. Even though this thingness cannot be realized itself, it 
remains apparent in the opposition it causes. 
    Brown’s idea of a thing could thus very well be understood to mean a Gegenstand in the 
Kantian sense. However, since my aim is to put my finger more on that which causes the 
Gegenstand to stand against, and not so much on the subject it is standing against, I will 
continue to use the word thing in this text. In accordance with Brown’s idea of »Thing 
Theory« and Daniel Miller’s notion of Stuff, I understand things to be the stuff of everyday 
life that cannot fully be grasped by our understanding. 
    When I see the object I do not see the thing, I see what I can recognize in the thing, 
what it reminds me of.  The object is more a reflection of my memory than something 
outside myself. Daniel Miller notes that objects are significant »precisely because we do 
not ›see‹ them.  The less we are aware of them, the more powerfully they can determine 
our expectations by setting the scene and ensuring normative behaviour, without being 
open to challenge.  They determine what takes place to the extent that we are unconscious 
of their capacity to do so« (Materiality 5).  The thing that makes an object recognizable can be 
experienced but it cannot really be described.  The insistence of things and the friction it 
produces lets them reappear out of oblivion.
    Just before Roquentin, the protagonist of Jean-Paul Sartre’s Nausea, has his famous epiphany 
over the roots of a chestnut tree and finds »the key to Existence« (129), his objects and words 
already begin to fray and disintegrate when he sits in a tramway: 
I lean my hand on the seat but pull it back hurriedly: it exists.  This thing I’m sitting on, leaning my hand 
on, is called a seat.  They made it purposely for people to sit on, they took leather, springs and cloth, they 
went to work with the idea of making a seat and when they finished, that was what they had made.  They 
carried it here, into this car and the car is now rolling and jolting with its rattling windows, carrying this 
red thing in its bosom. I murmur: »It’s a seat,« a little like an exorcism. But the word stays on my lips: it 
refuses to go and put itself on the thing. […] Things are divorced from their names.  They are there, 
grotesque, headstrong, gigantic and it seems ridiculous to call them seats or say anything at all about 
them: I am in the midst of things, nameless things.  Alone, without words, defenceless, they surround me, 
are beneath me, behind me, above me.  They demand nothing, they don’t impose themselves. (Sartre 125) 
Brown writes: »The story of objects asserting themselves as things, then, is the story of 
 a changed relation to the human subject and thus the story of how the thing really names 
less an object than a particular subject-object relation.« (4)
    The thing is strange.  All I can do is try to figure it out. But things are underwhelming. 
The friction they cause is not productive, their noise does not make sense.  The thing 
remains absurd. It reveals not itself but a disturbing excess, an indigestible residue. It is a 
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bother, potentially even uncanny (cf.  Trigg).  The futile action of 
reaching out in the attempt to objectify it, to pin it down using 
language, lets it become apparent as a rift: It is identifiable only as  
that which is not like anything else. It cannot exist as a con- 
cept. It is here because I am here struggling with it.  Thus, this 
underwhelming encounter with things refusing to shut up entails  
a chance of sublimity, a chance to experience the process of 
realization, of watching oneself recognize. For Kant, the sublime 
was not the beautiful per se, but rather connected to the realization 
of a »super-sensual capability«, which enables an intellectual 
transcendence of the resistance imposed on us by the harsh and 
overwhelming physical world. Due to its unfathomable size, the 
superiority of our environment leads to the realization of our 
cognitive faculties.  This realization is the sublime (Eisler »Erhaben«). 
Kant exemplified this with the overwhelming experience of 
standing by the sea and watching the power of the waves.  As the 
subject feels overpowered and helpless, he or she may realize that it 
is in fact he or she who realizes this overwhelming vastness and 
inconceivability after all. 
    I would like to argue that the same realization is possible when 
the subject is underwhelmed; the absurdity and unintelligibility of 
silent and stubborn things, of obsolete objects, is much more easily 
brushed aside and ignored than the breaking of big waves; never- 
theless, small things may cause a similar, albeit much quieter feeling 
of being lost or impotent. 2
It may be too bold to claim that a crumpled page has the potential 
to galvanize us out of self-oblivion. However, its stubbornness 
strikes me as an extraordinary banality: in this thesis, as in almost 
any other book, all pages with text on them look roughly the same. 
Usually, they are all printed on the same paper, the layout of the 
text does not vary. Following typographic standards, this establishes 
a visual grammar, which helps to orient and focus the reader; to 
silence the noise of the thing. ›Decluttering‹ aids to foreground the 
text and its abstract content. 3 
    This abstraction through noise reduction trajects the content; it is 
not thrown in my way, but across (›trans‹). My head intuitively turns 
2 The Japanese language has  
a rich vocabulary to grasp 
this endurance of the under- 
whelming noise of sheer 
things. To give just one ex- 
ample: the term /aware/ »is 
applied to the aspects  
of nature (or life, or art) 
that move a susceptible 
individual to an awareness of 
the ephemeral beauty of a  
world in which change  
is the only constant. His 
or her reaction may be a 
resigned melancholy or an 
awe, or even a measured and 
accepting pleasure« (Richie 
52).  
See also: Francesco Orlando’s 
extensive study  
/Obsolete Objects in the 
Literary Imagination. 
Ruins, Relics, Rarities, 
Rubbish, Uninhabited Places, 
and Hidden Treasures./ 
3 As a trained typographer, 
I am intimately aware of 
the standards of written 
communication. Typography 
is the attempt to give 
language a (reproducible) 
form. Good typography — in 
the eyes of many — makes the 
traces of the work of the 
typographer invisible: it 
lowers the noise of the 
materials of the text. A 
typographer manipulates this 
material to communicate 
ideas effectively. In order 
to do so, I need to get in 
touch with those materials 
of communication: this 
once meant setting actual, 
tangible lead characters, 
today it means to handle 
digital tools. I think it 
is fair to say I have what 
Richard Sennett calls a 
»material consciousness« 
for text (120). 
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away from the source of this movement, and I begin to wonder where the meaningful ob- 
ject might strike next.  The writing is meant to transcend its substrate.  As leaves of paper 
become pages, they fade out of attention and thus seem to become invisible; the words 
they contain are thought of as disembodied thought, bodiless effects. Vilém Flusser called 
this — in his opinion »problematic (doubtful)« (50) — attempt to lead the reader’s attention 
by removing distinctions »typification«. Without typification, reading would be impossible: 
Something printed is a typical thing, and not a distinctive, incomparable, unique thing.  A printed 
paper is a specimen, one among many examples of one unique thing (e.g., of a manuscript). 
Something printed is valuable not as a distinctive object (as this singular piece of paper) but as a 
type.  The interesting thing about it is not the production of print (of papers, of printed writing) 
but the production of the types (of the text). (51)
These crumples here activate and single out a page, hindering its abstraction and thus the 
abstraction of its content.  The crumples re-individualize the page–it is not typical any- 
more. But no thing is added or taken away.  The thing itself, the paper, has been crumpled;  
it has been in-formed. Flusser points out that »to inform originally meant ›to dig forms  
into something‹« (12) Understood this way, form is not solely abstract and conceptual but 
realized through a cognitive act of extraction: the effects resulting from the formation of 
some thing are recognized and foregrounded, the ungraspable thing sustaining them becomes 
a background-noise.  This in-formation of the page-paper-thing causes what I have just 
described as an unproductive friction, an irritation, slightly frustrating the reader’s synthesis, 
their hermeneutical endeavour.  The crumples re-present the paper.  They make apparent 
that the paper was there all along, a sustaining support, whose silencing through typification 
makes the meaning of the text possible.  These crumples are nothing like Kant’s waves. 
They are not awesome and terrific. However, as they disturb the flow of meaning, they  
might have the potential to reveal the unbridgeable existential gap between the things we 
encounter and the ideas we recognize in them. Beyond our frustration about things  
not working the way we want them to, there is a chance to realize how entangled we are 
in them, that making sense does not come ›naturally‹. 
    The body of digital media cannot be foregrounded by crumpling it like a page. It is even 
more successfully rendered ›invisible‹. In this research project, I sought ways to foreground 
the sustaining material support of digital devices, and their role in the hermeneutic pro- 
cess. How can their thingness be revealed, in the construction of meaning across an inter- 
face? The potential emptiness of a screen (or a digital projection) is clearly very different 
to the emptiness of a sheet of paper.  The aim of this thesis is to investigate this difference. 
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As I know that I cannot crumple digital interfaces as I can crumple a page, I make this futile 
attempt the focus of my inquiry. I try to be as insisting as the things that sustain meaning. 
My practice is concerned with the distance between the act of (in-)formation and under- 
standing. I approach things that have been in-formed to behave as digital machines and 
look at their effects, the only superficially immaterial in-formation they produce. I reflect 
my own position in this entanglement by actively and often futilely attempting to (re-)
insert myself in the ungraspable processes of digital translation. I investigate if Flusser’s 
claim that the »absurd objective world is stronger than the subject’s will to inform it« still 
holds true today, now that with highly advanced and ubiquitous digital interfaces, the 
literal in-formation of the physical page has become an abstract matter of resolution con- 
cerning bits lighting up pixels. 
But as my eyes fell on the pad of white sheets, I was struck by its look and I stayed, pen raised, 
studying this dazzling paper: so hard and far seeing, so present.  The letters I had just inscribed on 
it were not even dry yet and already they belonged to the past. [...] I had thought out this sentence, 
at first it had been a small part of myself. Now it was inscribed on the paper, it took sides against 
me. I didn’t recognise it any more. I couldn’t conceive it again. It was there, in front of me; in  
vain for me to trace some sign of its origin.  Anyone could have written it. But I... I wasn’t sure I 
wrote it.  The letters glistened no longer, they were dry.  That had disappeared too; nothing was left 
but their ephemeral spark. (Sartre 95)
Looking at a sheet of paper through the conceptual lens of digitalization may serve to reveal 
something about the preconceptions of the observer. I stubbornly resist seeing objects as 
interchangeable equals — this   A   on my screen here is not this   A   ; it is neither the 
electrical charges stored on my hard disk nor one of the letters you see printed out right 
now. How come I take the portion of an illuminated white rectangle in my text editing 
software, the contents of the screen of my e-ink ebook-reader or a PDF-file to be a page? 
How does this experience change the way I think about the objects sustained by the  
paper of a page in a book? How come I see that and this   A   as equals, even though the 
very Gegenstand, the thing sustaining them, has radically changed?
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ON STRUCTURE
This thesis consists of two parts.  The first section, titled THE CONDITION, is a phenomeno- 
logical and theoretical questioning of the computer as a thing. 
    First, (1.1) I approach it metaphorically. I compare computers and their interfaces with 
other worldly things: ruins (considering the existence of the machine, its resting  
body, and the expectations and promises it entails), vessels (thinking about function), and 
windows (reflecting on the notion of digital transparency and contingency).  Then, (1.2)  
I verbally enter the computer. I write about how the Turing machine came to embody and 
perform language by turning everything into writing and how it itself relies on written 
structures. 
    The space of language is the space between things; language relates things by denoting 
them but fails to grasp the thing itself. In this first section, I collect ideas and define a  
set of terms to stake out this ambiguous, inter-textual space as the background for my 
practice, a room I go on to furnish with things that cannot be put into writing. 
I begin the second part, titled THE CONCERN, by (2.1) revisiting Mel Bochner’s mural »No 
Thought Exists Without A Sustaining Support«, which has had a major influence on  
my work. I describe how Bochner’s work can be understood as making things embody 
and perform concepts. I then speculate about how his post-conceptual sensibility could be 
related to the so-called post-digital condition: Things re-emerge as it becomes apparent 
that there is always a physical remainder that cannot be wholly conceptualized.
    I follow by concisely introducing my practice as a series of exercises in grappling with 
the evasive body of digital media. I describe the conceptual journey that led to the 
individual projects, moving from questions and complications on the process of (digital) 
translation (2.2) and the physical act of in-formation (2.3), to interfaces as things (2.4).  
I regard the results of these exercises to be more than illustrations or materializations of 
the terminology I establish in the first section; I want them to become extensions of the 
linguistic inquiry into this thing that I constantly forget is here in front of me.  
    I include my work as reproductions, consciously regarding this inclusion as an act of 
writing things as images, of turning what I intend to show as distant things into di- 
gital objects once more, before they are printed.  The individual pieces appear several times 
in different forms, to raise questions around the links between them.  The physical exis- 
tence of the reproductions (as things) is what sustains the inter-references between the 
works and the text that I am interested in.
221
blank
222
Theodor Adorno notes that »indirectness can no more be hypostatized than can the poles 
of subject and object; it is valid only in their constellation.  Transmission is transmitted  
by what it transmits« (N 99). For Walter Benjamin »[i]deas are to objects as constellations 
are to stars« (O 34). In this way, I view the thesis as a constellation following Adorno and 
Benjamin’s ideas of constellations as a means to break binaries, and so also the idea of 
self-identicality. Rather than trying to directly identify a thing or situation, (to argue inside 
a framing structure or against it by trying to step out of it) they suggest encircling it. Since 
language eventually always fails to be completely abstract and objective, because it always — 
ever so slightly — misses its target, Benjamin and Adorno proposed using its abstracting 
trajectory to address the thing in question by retracing the multiplicity of its relations.  
I can only point at the ontology of digital objects, I cannot reduce it to the blueprints of 
computer chips or images of servers or by printing out binary code as zeros and ones.  
By associating things and ideas both conceptually and visually (through choices in layout 
and various numbering systems) I hope to evoke the material and cognitive friction that 
occurs when things are translated into and out of (digital) objects — the thingly space of 
(digital) transmedialization. 
    To continue this cross-referential approach, I am including reproductions of artworks by 
other artists and a few found images that resonate with certain passages of the text. The art- 
works appear as literal screenshots, digital photographs that show how I accessed the docu- 
mentation of the work online as a digital object. I think of those images as interjections.  
In the ›hard‹ copies of this text they are presented on smaller pages, as things amongst things.
I conclude the thesis by contextualizing my questioning within the wider debate on the 
contemporary digital condition, to ask: are we witnessing a resolution of existence? 
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A [INSTALLATION EMPTY / BLANK AT THE RCA WIP SHOW
At the Work-in-Progress-Show 2013 I showed the empty print (a) in constellation with 
(b) a print of a scan of a crumpled print of a digital photograph showing my slightly 
battered smartphone as I am ›flipping‹ a page in an ebook on the device. The text  
on the screen reads: “This page intentionally left blank.” On the floor underneath is (c)  
a cardboard box full of hand-written notes I found on the street. It is set on a library 
copy of Flusser’s Does Writing Have a Future?. 
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[APPENDIX B   SNOW
 The page inserted after this one is a cut-out from test print of the large lino-cut.
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[APPENDIX C.1   THE INFORMATION I — FILM STILLS
—>
—>
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[APPENDIX C.2   KUNSTWERK
I translated the German 
text of Benjamin’s essay 
The Work of Art in the  
Age of Mechanical Repro- 
duction from ASCII into 
binary code, into a string 
of zeros and ones. Since  
a string is notoriously 
hard to depict, I decided 
to turn it into a two-
dimensional bitmap. I 
added line breaks to let 
it flow into the pro- 
portions of the standard 
paper size. The resulting 
image is more like noise 
than information. In  
this form, the essay can- 
not be easily accessed  
by humans or computers. 
The meaning of the text is 
lost in (digital) 
translation, it is stuck 
in a limbo of formal 
material. 
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[APPENDIX C.3  THE INFORMATION I. 
 PREVIOUS INSTALLATION OF BOOKS
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[APPENDIX D  SCANNER EXPERIMENTS 
1  convex mirror, rocking on glass of scanner while being scanned
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2  convex mirror. (slight movement, at top), caught (1) the re- 
flection of the light sensor, (2) the reflection of the light shining 
through my studio window in the  (3) mirror, and  (4) the reflection 
of light shining through my studio window reflected on the table
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3a  scan of digital camera facing away from the glass, towards a mirror.
Film documenting the scan
—>|
—>
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3b  resulting image of digital camera while being scanned 
and catching its own reflection in the mirror.
245
blank
246
4  Scan of iPad (later turned into the sausage) that shows a  
page of the ebook of /The Information I/, positioned on piece of foam 
that slightly moved while scanning and fell over during the scan.
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[APPENDIX E.1  TECHNIQUES OF THE OBSERVER
The following spread shows a part of the tiled image of one of the scanners scanning  
the other.
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[APPENDIX E.2  TECHNIQUES OF THE OBSERVER — FILM STILLS
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[APPENDIX F.1  THE INFORMATION II  (all 25 scanned images) 
1 2
3
5 6
4
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7 8
9
11 12
10
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13 14
15
17 18
16
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21
23 24
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[APPENDIX F.2   THE INFORMATION II — FILM STILLS
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[APPENDIX F.3  TECHNIQUES OF THE OBSERVER  
 scan of damaged paper
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[APPENDIX G   LITERALLY – FILM STILLS
—> —>
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ENCOUNTER ONE.
He is standing at a self-checkout machine in a supermarket.  The man at the machine next 
to him wants to buy a piece of cheese.  The man scans it.  The machine tells him that 
assistance is needed.  A member of staff arrives promptly.  The employee scans the product 
once more. She looks at the screen and then tells the man that she is not allowed to sell 
him the cheese. She says she is sorry. She does not know why, but that this is how it has to 
be.  The computer system seems to know more than her. She does not need to know,  
and does not really seem to care to know either. She obeys the system and withholds the 
cheese. She apologizes once more and takes it away. 
    He wonders what she will do with the cheese. Is it really cheese? Maybe the fact that it 
is not processable, not scannable, not sellable, puts it outside the realm of language some- 
how, he thinks. Does it actually exist? After all, it appears to be unknown to the perception,  
to the logic, to the understanding of the machine.  The computer does not recognize it. 
Rendered unsayable, it thus ends up in an unacceptable state of limbo.  The machine rules 
that staff need to do away with it, whatever it might be.  And the staff comply.
    The computer is clearly in command here. So who knows, if the computer fails to know? 
Perhaps it is a fatal error rather than cheese, he thinks. Surprisingly, the man accepts the 
computer’s decision without any objection and calmly goes back into the shop. He 
assumes the man will try his luck with another piece. He wishes him the best of luck that 
the computer will let it pass as cheese this time. 
    »Have you swiped your Nectar card?«, the machine asks him as he is allowed to take all 
his items with him. He leaves with the strange feeling of having witnessed an authoritarian
side to the self-checkout machine. He could clearly hear its friendly voice paraphrasing: 
»Computer says No.«
    He muses that it is quite ironic that of all things it is cheese that goes against the grain 
of the system here — assuming that it is cheese, and keeping in mind that the computer does 
not know if it is cheese or not — as cheese has a longstanding tradition of being imitated. 
    He once read that cheese analogue can be made without any traces of milk at all.  
To make it, often everything but milk protein is replaced with vegetable oil. But even the 
milk protein can be substituted. He remembers that it struck him finding out that it is 
illegal in the EU to label such a product as ›cheese‹, if milk fat has been completely 
substituted for other fat. In the EU cheese must be made from milk to be allowed to be 
called ›cheese‹. It must not even be named ›imitation cheese‹ or ›cheese analogue‹, since 
[APPENDIX H 
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the word ›cheese‹ is only allowed to be used for products containing ›real‹ cheese. Instead 
it is called ›Pizza Mix‹ or »vegetable oil and protein mixture for melting«. 
    Smirking slightly, he ponders over the fascinating idea that a product that is made to be 
an image of cheese, looking, smelling, feeling, melting and (more or less) tasting like 
cheese, is nevertheless not allowed to be called ›cheese‹. It too has become an unsayable 
thing. It came very close to be similar to something that it is not actually supposed to  
be.  As an index, a medium, it tries to convey the information of cheese without actually 
being cheese; a solid, chewable, and meltable echo of cheese.
    Swaying his bag, he returns to contemplate the authoritarian self-checkout machine. 
The basic set-up of these machines is simple, he thinks.  As he scans the product, the 
lighter, normally white areas of the barcode area reflect the light of the scanner.  The 
scanner immediately registers this reflection and ›reads‹ it as a number.  The computer then 
looks up the number in a catalogue, where it has been linked with a price and other 
relevant information (such as the name of the product).  This information is displayed on 
the screen. Once the product has been identified, he has to put it into the ›bagging area‹, 
where a scale monitors if the weight of the scanned item matches its expected, preset 
value. If it does, the price is added to the bill.  The machine does not care if he buys a 
pineapple, toothpaste, sausages, condensed milk, sandwiches, walnuts or toilet paper, ham, 
chicken breasts, washing detergent, cucumbers, bananas, lettuce, sweet corn or wine, as for 
the machine they are just different numbers, electrical impulses, bits.
    Sitting on the bus, he considers sticking the barcode of a piece of cheese onto some- 
thing else with the same weight, a rock maybe, or some wood.  The machine would  
not mind. It would recognize it as cheese and charge the assigned price. He asks himself  
if this means that the machine could somehow transubstantiate stones into cheese. But 
what about the person who programmes it, he thinks, there must be someone who tells it 
what the numbers mean; or is this person also rather just following the algorithms set by 
the logic of the machine, like the friendly lady who took the cheese away?
Maybe the numbers are indeed the higher order of things, and since he and most other 
people are not proficient in reading binary numbers, everything is also still presented  
as the image (and text) of what it is (or rather supposed to be). For the computer it is only 
the numbers that count and so the shop is full of binary numbers in disguise for us human 
imbeciles.  A pineapple is a pineapple is a pineapple, he thinks. 
    Did the cheese — for by now he has decided to doubt no longer that it was cheese after 
all — quietly try to resist this forceful transcendence into the realm of digital sameness? Did 
it perhaps even reverse it, instantiating itself out of bodiless information? He asks him- 
self, if it would go too far to call the cheese emancipated. Once more, he wonders, what 
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happened to this unprocessable, reluctant cheese after it was taken away. Was it outcast? 
Was it relabeled, made compliant at last? He wonders if there are really just zeros and ones 
in this bag wobbling on the ledge as the bus stops and goes through the evening traffic. 
Could he possibly be fed on zeroes and ones? 
ENCOUNTER TWO.
He is already late for his appointment as his bicycle chain comes off. Ungracefully he turns 
his bicycle over and starts to fumble with the chain, trying to get it back on the gear. It 
takes uncountable attempts until he succeeds, by which time his hands are covered in grime.
    Checking his phone for the way once more (just to be sure), he notices how his fingers 
leave greasy marks all over the glass. Later that day, even after having scrubbed his hands 
heavily several times, he can make out the traces of his contact with the stuff he usually 
likes to not have to care about. As he pokes his computer to make the words he is thinking 
appear on the screen, he suddenly chuckles. Digital dirt, grubby fingers, he thinks.  The same 
digits he got dirty earlier are now writing this text. He makes them write other digits, 
digital digits, bits. But those digits probably could never get dirty, he supposes, continuing 
to poke the keyboard, hoping and expecting the machine to poke back at him.
ENCOUNTER THREE.
Writing this on a smartphone is so much harder than typing on a proper keyboard, he 
writes, tapping on the smooth, illuminated glass using only his right thumb. It is  
tedious and he constantly needs to delete nonsense.  The glowing »soft machine« (Buxton) 
has no palpable delineations, there is nothing to hold on to.  All the letters feel the same, 
slippery. He is reaching out for them according to the keyboard layout he holds in his 
mind. He tries to remember when he stopped having to circle his index finger over the 
keys to find the letter or symbol he desired. When did he internalize where he had to  
put his fingers to put the words out of his head and onto a screen? When did he become  
a typewriter (cf. Kittler G 214)? He cannot remember. Using a keyboard feels intuitive, he  
types. Sometimes, when he is bored, he closes his eyes and writes imaginary texts on 
imaginary keyboards. He knows where his fingers have to be to make As and Ls and %s 
appear, but he regularly forgets where his ][s are hidden.  
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But this shimmering reality is something else. It is as if he is reaching out for an apple on the  
table in front of him, constantly grabbing the pear, the orange, the oramgr, the applr, the peat 
next to it instead.  Again and again. ItMs frustrating. It reakky is.
    Still, slowly, and steadily, he moves on forward, downwards. Following his conditioned in- 
tuition, he lines up these letters, and the punctuation marks, and all the spaces between  
the words, tap by tap on those letters down there. His first thoughts have long disappeared 
somewhere up there. With a small gesture, a caressing of the glass, he could bring them 
back into sight. He knows that they are there. He knows that the crisp Helvetica his letters 
appear in under the glass in front of him, as well as everything else on the screen, is really 
just light, being blocked or allowed to pass through the pixels of the display. He has neither 
picked the font, nor decided its size, nor anything else about how his writing looks at this 
moment. In the end, none of this will matter anyway. 
    Later (right now, back then), he will take this text, this string of electrical impulses en- 
coding these letters, out of the ›cloud‹ it has been stored in. His phone, saving this draft, 
will have sent it as electromagnetic waves across the room to his WiFi router, which  
will have picked up the signal. It will then send off the 25 165 bits (11905 0s, 13 260 1s) 
through copper wires and fibre optic cables. He cannot remember when exactly he 
okayed for all of this to happen automatically.  There might have been a checkbox and a 
button that said »I AGREE«. Whatever, he thinks. He is unsure if it makes much of a differ- 
ence if he knows where his zeros and ones actually reside, before he orders them back  
to appear here. He knows that the ›cloud‹ is most definitely some hard disk on a server,  
a big chunky block in a row of other chunky blocks, hidden and locked away in a data 
centre far away. But this does not make it any less abstract to him, really. Whenever  
he thinks of data centres, he thinks of Sol LeWitt’s white cubes. But it could just as well be 
some fuzzy and foggy cloud after all. Or the moon. How would he know? Wherever they 
were, his zeros and ones will have waited there for him — most likely written as magnetic 
charges — to be sent back here. Infrastructure-wise, it is as if time and space do not matter 
for the reality of this text. But for some reason he stubbornly refuses to believe that. 
Sitting in front of his computer, slightly hunched, he will copy this text with a few move- 
ments of his index finger over the trackpad and some clicks. He will move it into the docu- 
ment titled ›Thesis‹.  And here it is.
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